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Abstract
The new failure detection algorithms ; the Robust Failure Detection and Isolation and the
Marginalized Likelihood Ratio Test; were applied to the problem of attitude determination
based on inertial instrument measurements and the Global Positioning System measure-
ments.
Direct application of the algorithms will cause significant false alarms, since the Global
Positioning System solution degrades severely under the following conditions: insufficient
number of observable satellites, narrowly scattered satellite constellation and obstructed
Global Positioning System receiver antenna.
Providing the filters a different set of gains in both the predetection stage and in the fail-
ure detection stage will reduce the number of these false alarms. In the preprocessing stage,
the different set of gains reduces the number of excessive spikes in the Global Positioning
System solutions. In the failure detection stage, using the different set of gains allows the
failure detection filters distinguish an unreliable Global Positioning System solution from
the instrument failure. The failure detection filters will recognize that any difference be-
tween the two measurements are due to the low quality of the Global Positioning System
solution rather than the bias or ramp failure in the instruments.
Thesis Supervisor: John J. Deyst, Jr.
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In April 9, 1994, the Boeing company rolled-out its newest commercial aircraft, the Boe-
ing 777. The Boeing 777 was designed as a brand new airplane and it embodies many
new features enabled by new technologies. It was designed to meet the economical re-
quirements of the future airline industry, and to be the commercial jet for the twenty-first
century, [43], [41], [40].
One interesting feature of the Boeing 777 is its fly-by-wire flight-control system. In the
fly-by-wire system, the pilot's control inputs from cockpit are turned into electrical signals
and those signals are transmitted through wires to computers and eventually to actuators of
movable surfaces on the wings and the tail. The states of the control surfaces are sensed by
various sensors, and these measurements are fed back along with inputs from inertial and
air data sensors to the computers. The computers in the fly-by-wire system serve several
purposes : monitoring the system performance, processing signals from one system to the
other, performing active control over the flight and others.
Modern fly-by-wire systems incorporate large numbers of sensors and actuators. For the
sake of reliability, there are redundant sensors and actuators to perform critical functions.
Redundancy also enables the aircraft tolerate failures and continue to fly without loss of
functionality. Design for redundancy was an integrated part of the development of the
Boeing 777.
It is extremely important that the redundant system know the condition of its redundant
elements. Once there is a failure, the system must recognize the failure and reconfigure itself
by isolating the failed element. Detecting a failure by comparing the outputs of replicated
elements is a well understood and fairly straightforward procedure. However, it is not always
the case that redundancy is achieved by replicating elements. In some systems, information
from diverse elements is combined through dynamic models, to monitor the health of the
system and identify failures.
There are several approaches to identifying the presence of failures in dynamics system
using dynamic models. The approach typically employs probability theory, detection theory
and linear system theory. Information from various sensors is combined in the mathematical
dynamic model, and the failure detection system compares the outputs of these sensors with
the output of the mathematical model. When there is significant discrepancy between the
output from a sensor and the output predicted by the mathematical model, the failed
elements can be diagnosed as failed and isolated, with appropriate reconfiguration of the
remaining unfailed system elements.
The model based failure detection process can be used to reduce the number of sen-
sors onboard. The output of the mathematical model acts as if it is real instrument and
thus represents redundancy. The drawback of this approach lies in the level of the actual
inaccuracy of the mathematical model. In certain extreme situations, the model may not
follow the actual dynamics of the real system due to unmodeled dynamics nonlinearities,
or parameter uncertainties. Thus, care must be taken to assure that the system functions
correctly over the entire flight envelope.
There is an increasing trend toward fly-by-wire systems. Redundancy management
and failure detection are key technologies which are enabling this trend. Some important
questions that must be addressed in designing fault-tolerant fly-by-wire systems are:
1. how mathematical models serve to augment redundant elements,
2. the relative performance of different failure detection algorithms,
3. the validity of failure detection systems, and
4. the range of operating conditions over which the failure detection system will work.
This Thesis will attempt to develop systematic methods for addressing these questions
and others.
1.2 Thesis Coverage
In December 1995 and January 1996, there were two new failure detection algorithms that
appeared in the engineering society journals. The Marginalized Likelihood Ratio appeared
in IEEE Transaction of Automatic Control [22], and a Robust Failure Detection and Iso-
lation [35], was published in the Proceeding of American Control Conference. These two
algorithms are the main focus of this thresis. These algorithms were derived using different
approaches. The derivations of the two were analyzed and discussed in the sequel in order
to provide insight into the algorithms. The performance of these algorithms is analyzed and
applied to a real problem of failure diagnosis. The algorithms are compared to each other
and to the well-known Generalized Likelihood Ratio test algorithm. Comparisons were
based on detection capability and the computational complexity. For detection capability,
the time of detection and the sensitivity of detection were used as performance measures.
In addition, the performance of the algorithms is evaluated using measures of missed alarm
and false alarm probability.
Finally, improvements in the performance of the failure detection algorithms using actual
instrument data are proposed and tested. The data obtained from actual instrument outputs
was corrupted by noise and other spurious signals. The failure detection algorithms in
the real experiment faced difficulties in distinguishing failures from random disturbances,
when they were applied without adaptive gain compensation. Improvements by providing
adaptive gains for the failure detection filters under certain circumstances is proposed and
was tested.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides background of the failure detection algorithm. The underlying principle
of the failure detection algorithm is the main theme of this chapter. The relationship
between reliability, redundancy and failure detection algorithm issue initiates the chapter.
Hypothesis testing that underlies the detection principle is presented for both types of
redundancy : hardware redundancy and analytical redundancy. This chapter ends after the
measure of the failure detection performance is given.
Chapter 3 presents the failure detection algorithms for linear discrete-time dynamic
systems based on statistics. Before proceeding to the main discussion, the structure of failure
detection process is discussed. The well-known Generalized Likelihood Ratio test for failure
detection in linear dynamic system follows the discussion. The Marginalized Likelihood
Ratio test for failure detection that appeared recently in 1996 is another statistical based
failure detection algorithm presented in this chapter. It has the properties that enhance
the performance of the GLR test. Numerical examples that demonstrate the GLR and the
MLR tests for failure detection in a linear dynamic system close the discussion of statistical
failure detection algorithm.
Chapter 4 presents another approach of failure detection. In this Chapter, the algorithm
developed deterministically becomes the focus of discussion. Instead of characterizing the
failure, the system dynamics, and the noise, with statistical attributes, the deterministic
algorithm characterizes them with a set descriptions. The algorithm is based on the worst
possible set of condition. The robust residual, data for decision making, is important
for detection purpose. Numerical examples is given how to generate this type of residual
from a robust estimator before proceeding to the discussion of the robust failure detection
algorithm. The development of the algorithm is given for both case : unknown dynamic
model and unknown dynamic and disturbance models. A numerical example of how to use
this algorithm is also presented here.
Chapter 5 presents the experiment of failure detection on the attitude determination
problem. Data from the real measurements are manipulated, and failures are injected at
certain time locations. The performance of both statistic failure detection algorithms and
deterministic one are then analyzed. The way to improve the performance of each algorithm
is presented in this chapter.
Chapter 6 presents the summary, conclusions and suggestions for future works.
In Appendixes, derivations of equations in the prior chapters are given.
Chapter 2
Reliability, Redundancy, and
Failure Detection-Isolation
The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the importance of redundancy for reliability. To
achieve an acceptable degree of reliability, redundancy is often the most effective method,
especially for flight critical systems. Redundancy in practice does not always involve repli-
cating similar components but sometimes physical components can be replaced by a behavior
model run in a computing system. The latter redundancy principle, together with replicat-
ing redundancy, can maintain an acceptable level of reliability if the behavioral model is
sufficiently accurate. Section 2.1 will discuss this concept.
When a component fails, it is important for the system to recognize the presence of
failure and isolate the failed component. This is the purpose of failure detection and isolation
algorithms. In Section 2.2, a typical failure detection algorithm is described. Even though
the isolation problem is not pursued in this thesis, its principle is briefly described.
There are many kinds of failure detection algorithms. The problem of choosing which
algorithm to apply in a particular situation is resolved if the required criteria are known.
Measures of failure detection algorithm performance are presented in Section 2.3.
2.1 Reliability and Redundancy
The performance of a dynamic system over a specified duration of time can often be pre-
dicted by applying reliability analysis. Reliability analysis makes use of probability theory
to determine the failure probability of a system. It is shown in [44] that systems with cer-
tain configurations have better reliability than the others. The following example is taken
from [44] to illustrate how different configurations of components can improve the reliability
of a system's performance.
P(x)-0.998
x-axis gyro
P(y)=0.998
y-axis gyro
P(z)=0.998
z-axis gyro
Figure 2-1: Reliability model of 3 one-degree-of-freedom gyros
xy-axis gyro xz-axis gyro
P(x)=0.99
Figure 2-2: Reliability model of 3 two-degree-of-freedom gyros
The first configuration, illustrated in Figure 2-1, consists three high reliability one-
degree-of-freedom gyros that measure angular rate in three orthogonal directions (x, y, z).
The second configuration, illustrated in Figure 2-2, uses three two-degree-of-freedom gyros
to do the same function as the first configuration. The reliability of the individual gyros
used in the second configuration is 5 times lower than for the gyros of the first configuration.
The probability of failure-free operation of the first configuration is
P(Xgood)P(ygood)P(zgood) = (0.998) 3 = (1 - 0.002) 3 1 1 - 3 x 0.002 = 0.994.
The failure-free probability of the x-axis of the second configuration is
P(Xgood) = P(x1 + X4) = 1 - P( 14) = 1 - 0.012 = 0.9999
and for failure-free operation of the entire system is
P(xgood)P(Ygood)P(zgood) = (1 - 0.0001) 3 P 1 - 0.0003 = 0.9997
Y72 -
Figure 2-3: Redundancy with parallel structure
which is twenty times more reliable than the first system.
In the redundant system of Figure 2-3, several signal paths perform the same function.
Failure of one or more paths still allows the remaining paths to perform the function prop-
erly. The reliability is eventually maintained. There are two approaches that can be used
to provide redundancy, i.e.
1. hardware or direct redundancy
2. analytical redundancy
Each will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Hardware redundancy applies replicated
hardware elements to provide a desired function. The hardware elements are sometimes dis-
tributed spatially around the system to provide protection against localized damage. Such
schemes typically operate in triple or quadruple redundant configurations and redundant
outputs are compared for consistency. When a failure occurs, the output from the failed
sensor is isolated and the output of an unfailed sensor is used to perform system functions.
The hardware redundancy principle can be described mathematically as
i: t -+ 9 (2.1)
i= 1,..., n
i = Yj (2.2)
Y = D)hr(71,.. . ,n) (2.3)
Figure 2-3 is an illustration of the Equations (2.1) - (2.3). The Fi represents the function
of each of the hardware components. There are n components and each component receives
inputs t and provides outputs P. Each component performs the same function and the
decision function Dhr determines which outputs are to be used.
Analytic redundancy applies dissimilar inputs to provide some desired function. This
information is related to the input variables by a certain functional relationship. This
redundancy principle can be described by the following mathematical expressions.
.Fi : i -+ 9 (2.4)
i=1,...,n
FZ 3 Fj (2.5)
= Dar (Vi, ... , n) (2.6)
Different functions .Fi receive different inputs ti to produce the same output P. The output
j used for system operation is determined by the decision function Dar.
Both hardware redundancy and analytic redundancy can improve the reliability of dy-
namic systems. The major disadvantage encountered with hardware redundancy is the cost
and the additional space required to accommodate the redundant equipment. The major
disadvantage with analytic redundancy is the additional complexity and software required.
To maintain the reliability of a redundant system, the system itself should have the
capability to recognize the presence of failures of its components. It can be catasthropic if
the system uses the output of failed components. Thus, the ability to recognize the failure
of its components and to reconfigure its structure is an important attribute of the system.
Hence care must be taken to assure that the possibility of common mode failure is remote.
Hardware redundancy uses direct voting to identify failures. The voting process assumes
that each sensor is independent of the others. This assumption raises the question of whether
the identical sensors operating in the same condition can be considered independent.
Various approaches to Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) using analytical redun-
dancy have been reported in technical papers, for example [15], [12], [29], [13], and [42].
Several survey papers [49], [17], examine several FDI algorithms and provide comment on
the characteristics, advantages, disadvantages, and trade-offs involved in the various FDI
techniques.
2.2 Failure Detection and Isolation
To determine whether or not a component has failed, detection algorithms are often used.
These algorithms are often based on statistical hypothesis testing because ordinary noise
and other errors in the outputs of sensors make the failure detection task uncertain. In this
approach, each of the possible scenarios corresponding to a hypothesis is defined. For FDI
purposes, the following hypotheses are usually used
* Ho : the hypothesis of no-failure mode
* Hi : the hypothesis of failure mode
The object is to determine whether Ho or Hi holds at each point in time that a test is made,
based on insufficient information to determine with certainty which hypothesis holds. This
approach is known as a binary hypotheses testing, [46], [50], in which either Ho or Hi
is true. At each time the hypothesis test is conducted and a decision is made, one of the
following possibilities will occur:
1. Ho true, Ho chosen
2. Ho true, Hi chosen
3. Hi true, H1 chosen
4. H true, Ho chosen
The result of a hypothesis test is specified in terms of a decision rule. Mathematically, a de-
terministic decision rule is a function iH(.) that uniquely maps every possible N-dimension
of observation Yt to one of the two hypotheses, Ho and H1 , i.e. :
H: Yt E RN ---+ Ho, Hi}.
From this perspective, choosing the function H(.) is equivalent to partitioning the observa-
tion space y = {Y,..., YN} into two disjoint decision regions, corresponding to the values
of y for which each of the two possible decisions are made, [50].
From all the possibilities given, it is desirable that the decision rule will minimize prob-
ability of false alarm and probability of miss alarm. The probability of false alarm corre-
sponds to the situation that H1 is chosen while Ho is true, and the probability of miss-alarm
corresponds to the situation that Ho is chosen while H1 is true.
Binary hypothesis testing has a geometric interpretation. As the observations are ob-
tained, there is a certain region in decision space that belongs to Ho and there is also
another region that belongs to H1. The decision space, the Ho region, and the H1 region
will be described in the sequel.
2.2.1 Hypothesis Testing in Hardware Redundant Systems
Consider the following measurement model of Ho:
Yt = HtXt + Vt (2.7)
where
* t : time at which an observation is made
* Yt : observation vector, Yt E 7Zn
* Xt : state vector, Xt E r
* Ht : measurement matrix of rank r, Ht E nxr, and r < n
* Vt : measurement noise with covariance matrix R
Similarly, the measurement model for the failure hypothesis H1 is :
Yt = HtXt + Vt + T(t, to) (2.8)
and T(t, to) is vector of change.
Hypothesis testing, in the following discussion, will be developed in parity space [4],
which is a linear transformation of redundant measurements to facilitate failure detection.
The parity vector that spans the parity space is a measure of the relative consistencies
between the elements of the redundant observation Y. The mapping from the observation
vector Yt into a parity vector Ct can be described by the following equation :
(t = CtYt (2.9)
The matrix C is a special matrix such that Ct E R(r-n) x n . For linear time-invariant system,
the subscript of t can be dropped. The rows of the of C are an orthonormal basis of the
Figure 2-4: Typical 2 dimension decision region
left null space of H, i.e.
CH
CC
T
= 0 (2.10)
= Ir-n
A method for constructing the C matrix can be found in [14], [38] and Appendix A. When
there is no additive failure, the parity equation is
(to = C(HtXt + Vt) = Ct (2.11)
and hence (to is a linear transformation of unfailed sensor errors. In the presence of additive
failure, the parity equation becomes
l1 = C(HtXt + Vt + T(t, to)) = CVt + CT(t, to) (2.12)
Note that the system state is eliminated in both (2.11) and (2.12) and only sensor errors and
failure effects remain. When the magnitude of additive failure is known a priori, the decision
space can be illustrated in Figure 2-4. This figure describes the parity space spanned by
Ee - 2 .
Decision function is eventually developed based on the following criteria :
_ __I_ _ _____1_1____ ~_ _I_______rr~____ li:~__ ___ __7___ 1_~_~
1. magnitude of parity vector
2. direction of parity vector
There are several ways to infer the presence or absence of a failure from the parity
vector and compare it to a certain threshold. One method applies the likelihood ratio
for hypothesis testing. The following approach is used in [24], and the derivation can be
obtained in [11].
In the absence of failures, the parity vector is Gaussian random variable with the fol-
lowing properties :
E[Ct] = 0 (2.13)
C = cov[t] = CtRtCtT (2.14)
The detection function is defined by
D = (TC 1( (2.15)
If D exceeds a certain threshold value, it is likely that a failure has occurred inside the
system. This situation indicates that the the magnitude of ( = |1|11 is large compared to
what would be expected if there were no failure.
2.2.2 Hypothesis Testing in Analytically Redundant Systems
The analytic redundancy approach can be formulated using state-space methods. The state-
space equations characterize the dynamic behavior of the systems and the properties of the
measurement outputs. The state-space equations, thus, provide complete description of the
systems of interest, [10].
The hypotheses developed for FDI purposes are usually described by the following dis-
crete time state-space equations :
Ho: Xt+l = AtXt + BtUt + Wt (2.16)
Yt = HtXt + JtUt + Vt (2.17)
Hi: Xt+1 = AtXt + BtUt + Wt + rT(t, t0) (2.18)
Yt = HtXt + JtUt+Vt + ETy(t, to)
where
* t E R1 : time of observation
* Xt E Rn : state vector
* Yt E 7 : observation vector
* Ut E R m : input vector
* At E "n n : dynamic matrix
* Bt E "nx m : control input matrix
* Ht E rxn : state measurement matrix
* Jt E rx m : input measurement matrix
* Wt : process noise with covariance Qt E T n xn
* Vt: measurement noise with covariance Rt E Rnxn
* Tx,y(t, to) : dynamic vector of additive failure
* F, E : failure matrices
Hypothesis testing based on the parity space approach can be extended to analytically
redundant systems. In a hardware redundant system, one observation is adequate to con-
struct the parity space. This is not the case for analytically redundant systems.
Instead of considering the left null space of the observation matrix Ht, the left null space
of the observability matrix is used in an analytically redundant system. The observability
matrix is defined by
H
HA
O(H, A) = (2.20)
HAn-1
(2.19)
Consider the array of measurements from time 1, (1 < 1 < n) until time t. The measurement
equation from equation (2.17) will give the following description :
Yt-1+1 = OIXt-1+1 + J(B, J)Ut 1 + I(In, O)W,-tl, + V-,+1 (2.21)
where
01(H, A) =
H
HA
HAl-1
is the subset of the observability matrix and
y-l+1 =
Yt-l+1
t-/+2
Yt
t-1+1 =s <- +1 =
Xt-+1
Xt- 1+2
Xt
and Ut-+ 1 =
Ut-l+1
Ut- 1 +2
Ut
The system dynamic noise and the measurement noise arrays are
Wt-l+1
Wt- 1 +2
Wt
and v-1+1 =
Vt-I+1
t-l+2
Vt
The covariance matrix of W _ 1+1 will be a block diagonal matrix with 1 Q's on the diagonal,
and the covariance matrix of Vl-1+, will be block diagonal matrix with I R's on the diagonal.
For further reference, the definition above will be described in the following operational form:
It Q and It R
Wtt-I+1
Two matrices from the Equation (2.21) are defined as follows
fJ(B,J)
J1(In, 0)
J
HB
HAl- 2B
H
J ... O
... HB J
0 ... 0
... H 0
If we define the following quantities
observation : Yt-,+l
noise: : I- t+
= ,,t-1 - JL(G, J)Ut1-+l
= (In, O)W-l+1 + V-1+1
(2.22)
(2.23)
(2.24)
with covariance matrix
R1 = J1(In, 0)(I 9 Q) JT(In, 0) + I ® R, (2.25)
a regression model that resembles Equation (2.7) will be obtained.
t-l--1 = O1Xt-l+1+ f-1+ (2.26)
The parity space of order 1, (1 < 1 < n) is the left null space of the observability matrix,
namely the set
St = span{vJvT O(H, A) = 0} (2.27)
The parity vector Ct is defined by
(t = vT- t . (22( .28)
When there is no additive failure, the parity vector will be
(t = vT(OtX-t+l + 4t-t+) (2.29)
= VTit-l+1
The geometrical interpretation of the parity space is the same as that of the hardware
redundancy case.
The hypothesis testing presented in this chapter with parity space is not the only way
to identify the failure. There are other ways as we will see in the subsequent chapters.
However, these algorithms still work on the same framework of hypothesis testing.
2.2.3 Failure Isolation
It is important to provide isolation to the failed components after the failure is detected
so the system can disregard the output of the failed components. There are basically two
approaches for fault isolation [39] :
1. Structured residuals
which are designed to generate residual vectors so that in response to a fault only a
fault-specific subset of the residual elements are non-zero
2. Fixed direction residuals
where the residuals are designed to lie in fixed and fault-specific direction in the
residual space in response to each different fault. This is the basic idea of the failure
detection filter [5], [26].
Residuals are processed observations that carry the failure information.
For the systems with hardware redundancy, as described in Section 2.2.1, once a failure
is detected, the failure is isolated to the sensor which maximizes the isolation decision
function. The isolation decision function for the j-th component is defined as [24]:
)hrj - (2.30)
where cj is the j-th column of matrix C defined in the parity derivation.
In this thesis, the problem of isolation and reconfiguration is not pursued. The discussion
of the subsequent chapters will be for detection problems only.
2.3 Measures of Failure Detection Algorithm Performance
Some indices of performance, that are often used for evaluation of detection algorithms are
the following [4], [38].
1. Probability of false alarm or false alarm rate.
The probability of false alarm is defined as
PFA = P00[Hi chosen]
2. Mean delay for detection.
The mean delay for detection is defined by
tMD = E0 1 (ta)
where ta is the alarm time of the change detector
3. Probability of missed detection.
PMD = Pol [Ho chosen]
4. Accuracy of estimates of change time, direction and magnitude of failure.
5. Computational complexity of the algorithm
It was discussed in Section 2.2 that two hypotheses were used for failure detection
purposes. Suppose that we have a one dimensional observation with the probability densities
of Ho and H 1 as shown in Figure 2-5. Before the failure occurs, the observation has o00 mean
and after the failure occurs, the observation has 01 mean. The threshold Oth is chosen to
determine whether the observation is failed or not. Figure 2-5 also illustrates the one-
dimensional decision region. In this particular region, the false-alarm probability and the
threshold probability of miss-alarm
I: probability of false-alarm
II I
III
fQOIHo) I f(O lH1)
t I I
declare H0  declare H 1
0 8
S th
Figure 2-5: Decision region and its probability densities
miss-alarm probability are defined in [46], [4], [14] as
PFA = fo(O0Ho)dO
PMA = I fo(0IHi)d
It is not an easy task to set the threshold Oth to satisfy a certain performance. The trade-off
between PFA and PMA will determine the performance of a failure detection system.
-- ---
Chapter 3
Statistical Failure Detection
Algorithms
Failure detection algorithms based on statistical hypothesis testing are the main focus of
this chapter. Hypothesis testing is applied to the statistics of the observation. Before ex-
ploring failure detection algorithms, Section 3.1 introduces the structure of failure detection
processes. Each stage of the process in this detection structured will be discussed.
The discussion of several statistical failure detection algorithms will be given in Sections
3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. In Section 3.2, the discussion is focused on the well-known GLR, Gen-
eralized Likelihood Ratio, test for failure detection in linear dynamic systems. Section 3.3
will present the MLR, Marginalized Likelihood Ratio algorithm from Gustafsson, which can
provide better performance than the GLR test. The efficient implementation of the MLR
test algorithm is discussed in Section 3.4.
Numerical examples that illustrates how to apply the GLR test and the MLR test
algorithms will be given in Section 3.5.
3.1 The Structure of The Failure Detection Process
The failure detection process essentially works in a certain structure, [7] (Figure 3-1 ) :
* residual generation
* decision making
Residual residuals Statistical decision Decision failure
Generation Processing statistics decision
observations
residual generation decision process for failure detection
Figure 3-1: The structure of the failure detection process
The formal statement of the residual generation process is given as follows, [17].
For a given system, e.g.,
(t) = f ((t), u(t),t)
y(t) = h(x(t), u(t), t)
where
* z(t) is the state vector,
* u(t) is the input vector, and
* y(t) is the observation vector,
and under the assumption that a residual vector r(t) carrying information about a particular
fault exists, find an algorithm that generates r(t) when the fault has occurred, under the
conditions that there is time constraint for residual generation and there are uncertainties
in
1. time of failure;
2. nominal system model;
3. process noise and measurement noise models.
Residuals carry information that reflects possible changes of interest in the observed
signal or system. In residual generation, the observations are processed to enhance the
effect of possible failures. The residuals represent the difference between various functions
of the observations and the expected values of these functions in the failure-free mode. When
a failure occurs there is a difference between the values of the residuals in the presence of
failure and the values that can be expected in the normal mode.
To generate the residuals, it is essential that the following conditions exist.
1. Knowledge of normal behavior of the system.
2. Definitiveness of the "faulty" behavior.
3. Existence of analytical redundancy relations.
4. Availability of observations that reflect the failure.
5. Satisfactory accuracy of the redundant information.
The second element of a failure detection algorithm is decision making. The residual
will be processed statistically to provide information as to whether or not a failure occurs.
The decision function can be formulated using a hypothesis testing framework. The level of
complexity in decision making varies. The simplest method is to compare the instantaneous
residuals with a certain threshold. More complex approaches, e.g., sequential probability
ratio test of Wald, [48], can also be used to increase performance of the system. The choice
of which statistical method to use for decision making depends on the need based on the
criteria given in Chapter 2.
The following subsections provide descriptions of each stage of the failure detection
structure.
3.1.1 Residual Generation
For a dynamic system, there are a number of different techniques for generating residuals.
Those techniques can be classified into the following categories :
1. Parity space approach.
2. Observer based approach :
* diagnostic observer;
* innovation-based filter.
3. Parameter identification approach.
The Parity space method was described in the Chapter 2.
The Diagnostic observer approach actually involves a number of different but closely con-
nected methods based on the idea of predicting the system's outputs from the measurements
using a state observer. The failure detection filter and the Luenberger based observers be-
long to this class.
The Innovation-based filter or Kalman filter generates zero mean Gaussian innovations with
known covariance when no failures are present.
The Parameter identification approach makes use of the fact that the failures in a dynamic
system are reflected in the physical parameters, e.g., friction, mass, viscocity, etc.. The
idea of the parameter identification approach is to detect the faults via estimation of the
parameters of the mathematical model of the system [17]. This approach is not pursued
further in this thesis.
A model will now be developed for generating residuals. For a linear discrete-time
system for which there are no measurement errors, the following model is appropriate.
Xt+l = Atxt + Btut (3.1)
Yt Htxt, (3.2)
where the observer of Equation (3.1), is described by
:t+l = Atit + Kt[yt - Ht.t] + Btut (3.3)
rt = t - HtIt. (3.4)
The purpose of the observer method is to find Kt such that the error of state-estimation is
small. This is not the case for failure detection purposes. The gain matrix Kt, for failure
detection purposes, is chosen such that the effects of certain failures are accentuated in the
filter residual.
To illustrate how the failure detection filter works, we consider the following system in
the presence of failure
Xt+l = Axxt + Btut + biv6t--*, (3.5)
where bi is the i-th column of the matrix B and characterizes the effect of a failure in the
actuator-i, v is the magnitude of the failure, and T* is the time of failure. The residual
dynamics are described by the following difference equation :
rt+l = [At - KtHt]rt + biv6t-Tr. (3.6)
This shows that rt qualifies as a residual since it is an output from a system solely driven by
failures. Consider the problem of selecting Kt for the purpose of enhancing failure detection.
Let
Kt = aI n x n + At (3.7)
be the gain for the failure detection filter. The dynamic of the residual described by equa-
tion (3.6) becomes
rt+l = -rlnxnrt + biv6ttr (3.8)
rt = r t  bi [1 - (-a)t] (3.9)
If we choose a carefully, as the effect of the initial condition vanishes, rt maintains in a fixed
direction given by bi with magnitude proportional to the failure size v.
An observer that works well in the presence of noise is the Kalman filter [8], [6], [19],
[28]. This filter is developed to provide the best estimate of the state vector to minimize
variance. The Kalman filter generates a special residual vector, i.e., innovation sequence. It
is special since the sequence is uncorrelated in time. Why it is important to use uncorrelated
variables will be clear in the subsequent section.
The Kalman filter for discrete-time linear system :
Xt+l = Atxt + Btt + wt+6t-* v (3.10)
Yt = Htxt + et (3.11)
assuming Gaussian statistics for the noise inputs :
wt E N(0, Qt)
et E N(O, Rt)
xO E N(0, 0o)
is given by the following algorithm :
110(r*) = xo
Pilo(7*) = P
Et(7-*) -Yt - Httlt-l(r*)
St(-r*) = HtPtlt-1 (r*)HT + Rt (3.12)
Kt(*) = PtIt-(r*)HtTYS (7 * )
:t+11t(T*) = Attlt-1(r*) + AtKt(r*)Et(r*)
Pt+llt(7*) = At (Ptt,_I (*) - Kt(r*)HtPtlt_(r*)) AT + Qt + 6(t - r*)P,
The observations are denoted by Yt, the input is ut, and xt is the state. The innovation
sequence of the Kalman filter is denoted by et. The state jump v with covariance P, occurs
at the unknown time instant T*, and 6j is the impulse function that is one if j = 0 and zero
otherwise.
3.1.2 Statistical Decision Function
Testing between two hypotheses Ho and HI on the residual is the method used to determine
the presence of a failure. In [46], it is shown how hypothesis testing can be expressed as a
likelihood ratio test. The logarithm of the likelihood ratio, defined by
Sy = In Po0 (Y) (3.13)p00 (y)'
becomes the main tool for failure detection. The variable sy in Equation (3.13) is called
the log-likelihood ratio or LLR. The following example shows how LLR can be applied to
identify the presence of a failure.
Example of a LLR test for detecting a change in the mean of the observation.
Let us suppose that the output of a typical sensor has a Gaussian distribution with mean
value of po and variance a 2 . Assume that failures can cause shifts in the mean and that
we have a priori knowledge of the mean shift /i1 that constitutes a failure. To identify the
presence of failure, we set the following hypotheses :
"# = o
"#1 = #1
The probability density corresponding to each hypothesis is
1
=- ffi exp
1
2= exp
For each observation yi we define the LLR
si inPO (Yi)
p0o (yi)
#1 - Po
2 Yi
- 2
The decision function is
= zsi
11 +Po)
The stopping rule for the failure detection algorithm is
ta = N. min{K: dK = 1)
where
d if S{(K) < h
1 if Sf(K) > h
sN NKSN(K-1)+l
P0o(y)
Po, (y)
(Y - o) 2
2o 2  )2a
11 - o (Y
i=1
It is described in [4] that this change detection algorithm is one of the oldest and most
well-known algorithm for continuous inspection, and is called Shewhart control chart.
There are several new variables that appear in the previous example. These will be
referred to in the subsequent sections and chapters. These quantities are defined as :
I c NaI
t t
K
buffer of observation
K+1
I Yobservation
time axis
Figure 3-2: Determining the decision function from observation
* Cumulative sum :
k
IS =
i=i
(3.14)
* Decision function : 9k-
For problem with Gaussian distribution
(3.15)
where
(3.16)
* Decision rule :
0 if gk
1 if gk
For problem with Gaussian distribution
0 if S(
1 if SN(
< h; Ho is chosen
h; H1 is chosen
K) < h; Ho is chosen
K) 2 h; H1 is chosen
(3.17)
(3.18)
L
gk = S N (K)
* Stopping rule :
t = N -min{K: dK = 1} (3.19)
Figure 3-2 illustrates how the observation is conducted and the indices that correspond
to each definition. The observation is obtained sequentially in time, and is put inside the
buffer of observation. The decision function is determined from the processing of data with
fixed-length N. The processing for each step K is initiated from time ti and ended at
time tf. The observation is stopped after the fist sample of size N for which the decision
is in favor of H 1. The choice of threshold h depends on the miss-alarm and false-alarm
probability selection.
In many applications, it is common that p1 is not known a priori. In [4], it is explained
that there are two possible solutions in this case. The likelihood ratio for known 01 is given
by
An = Pol (Y, .. . , Yn) (3.20)
P00 (Y1, • • • Yn)
For unknown 01, An is replaced by another statistic. The first one is based upon the
weighted likelihood ratio :
-+00 Poe(Y1, Yn)An = Poo (I, , yn)dF(01). (3.21)
-oo 00 (yl, , -UYn)
In this approach, the likelihood ratio is weighted by a weighting function dF(01) with respect
to all possible values of the parameter 01. F(0 1) may be interpreted as the cumulative
distribution function of a probability measure. The failure detection algorithm resulting
from this approach is known as the X2 -cumulative sum.
The X2-cumulative sum failure detection algorithm is given as follows
AI = cosh[b (k - +1) exp - (k -j + 1) (3.22)
X - ISk (3.23)
k
= -- (yi -,o) (3.24)
b - (3.25)
This algorithm is developed based on a problem of detecting a change in mean of Gaussian
sequence with known variance a 2. The derivation here is special, the distribution F(9) =
F(p) is concentrated on two points, i.e. io - v and po + v. For real application, this
situation is reasonable, the output of sensor can be shifted by either positive or negative
bias. The weighted likelihood ratio of Equation (3.21), then can be expressed as
Sc exp [bk b(k- 1) dF() (3.26)
The stopping time in the X2-cumulative sum failure detection algorithm is thus
ta = mink:gk >h (3.27)
gk = max In cosh(bS) - -(k- + 1) (3.28)1j:5k [ 3 2 J
The second approach to determine the likelihood ratio when 01 is unknown uses the
generalized likelihood ratio - GLR
- sup01 POi(yl,... ,y n)An Po(Y,.,Y) (3.29)
poo (Y1, - -- n)
In this approach, the unknown parameter 01 is replaced by its maximum likelihood estimate.
The decision function in GLR is given by
gk = max In!Ak = max sup S (901 ) (3.30)1<j<k 1l<jk 01
The following example shows how GLR is used to provide the decision function 9k for
detecting changes in the mean from independent Gaussian sequence. From the previous
example of detecting change from sensor output, we have
k
S M P A + Y (3.31)
2=3
Define
v = A1 - P0 (3.32)
then
g-- k mai (Y,)i - 0) 2
g= [ max i 2  2a2 (3.33)
1 -jk 2 2
where
(1kDyJ = i - IO- Vmin + Vmin (3.34)
k-j+1
The next sections describe the development of these decision functions for failure detec-
tion in linear dynamic systems. It is interesting to note in the next section how the output
of linear system is fit into these statistical decision functions.
3.2 The GLR Test for Failure Detection in Linear Dynamic
System
The GLR test used for failure detection in linear dynamic system was proposed by Jones
and Willsky in [51]. The hypotheses used for the purpose of failure detection in linear
dynamic systems are given by Equations (2.16) - (2.19). For observations over a finite
interval ti < 7r* < tf, the likelihood ratio of the hypothesis test is given by :
Atf (7*, v) = P(Yt . ,ytIH, r*,)(3.35)
p(yt,,..., ytf IHo)
If yt is the observation sequence from a dynamical system it is difficult to compute Equa-
tion (3.35), because the observation sequence is not independent [1]. It will reduce the
complexity of the computation if the innovation sequence is used to determine the likeli-
hood ratio instead of the observation sequence. The innovation sequence is a white process,
i.e. it is an uncorrelated sequence. This property enables the computation of the joint
probability density of the white sequence as
tf
p(Eti, ... , Etf) = P(Et,) ... P(Et ) = IP(Et) (3.36)
ti
Under each hypotheses of Equations (2.16) - (2.19), the new hypotheses can be defined as
Ho : CteZ (3.37)
H 1  : et(r*)Et + PT(r*)v (3.38)
where PT (r*) is the failure signature, which can be recursively computed, eZ° is the inno-
vation sequence in the absence of failure. Recall that the innovation sequence is obtained
from the Kalman filter.
The likelihood ratio for hypothesis test now becomes
At ( *, v) p(Eti,..., Etf IH , T, V)
P(eti,..., Etf |Ho)
k=tf
t p(Ek|H, r*, )= P(CkIHv) (3.39)
k= ti p(klHo)
The last equality follows from the independence of the innovation process. The LLR from
Equation (3.35), with the Gaussian assumption, is given by
lt(7*,v) = lnAtf(7r*,v)
= vft;f (*) - 2 (*)2 (3.40)
where
t=tf
f;if(TW) = Za~t t(*7*)S )et(r* (3.41)
t=ti
t=tf
it (7*) = • 1Pt(7*)Srl Pt7) (3.42)
t=ti
How Equation (3.35) is derived to result Equations (3.41) - (3.42) is given in the Appendix
B.4. The quantity St is obtained from the Kalman filter. Note that It is used to describe
the decision function instead of gt. The intention here is to distinguish the decision function
for linear dynamic system lk from the general decision function g.
The GLR is given by
It = max lt(7*, U) (3.43)
As described in the previous section, the magnitude of failure the v is replaced by its
maximum likelihood estimate. This maximum likelihood estimate of v is obtained by taking
the derivative of Equation (3.42), and set that derivation equal to zero. Hence,
fl-r)= ([ (T)) f 1(r*) (3.44)
Substituting the Equation (3.44) into Equation (3.42) gives
it = ( 7ft,*)T ((*)) f (T*) (3.45)
Another interpretation of Equation (3.45) is given by the following equation
It = f,(-*)TR f(Tr*) (3.46)
The last equation shows that essentially i-1 is the error variance of the estimate Pt. The
corresponding hypotheses with respect to Equation (3.46) are
H0
Hi1
S = 0
v # 0
(3.47)
(3.48)
A failure is declared if It is larger than a threshold h. The test is computed for each possible
7* and the estimated 7* is the one giving the maximum likelihood of It :
* arg max It (r*, Pt(7*))t (3.49)
To implement the GLR test for failure detection in linear dynamic system, the following
algorithm can be used [22], [21]:
1. Calculate the innovation sequence et under Ho hypothesis.
2. Determine the quantities Vt(T*), f f (7*), and Rt, (7*) for each (r*) : ti < (T*) < tf.
3. Compute the estimate of vt(7*), i.e., flt(7*) recursively.
4. Compute the estimate of LLR
(fthis quantityr) (is compared agains  the thre hol  )
this quantity is compared against the threshold h.
5. The possible jump time is given by
* = arg max It (*, Pt (7*))
Real-time or on-line application of the GLR requires the recursive form of Equation (3.44).
In Appendix B.3 and B.4, the recursive expression form for Equation (3.44) is given.
3.3 The MLR Test for Failure Detection
The MLR - Marginalized Likelihood Ratio test treats the parameter v in a different way.
Instead of taking the maximum-likelihood estimate for v, the MLR test treats v as a random
variable.
From probability theory, we know that for random variables A and B, the following
equality is true :
p(A) = p(AIB)p(B) dB (3.50)
The technique given in Equation (3.50) is called marginalization. Integrating the conditional
probability p(AjB) multiplied by p(B) with respect to random variable B will give the
distribution function p(A) which is independent of the random variable B. This is the
technique used by MLR to eliminate the nuisance parameter v.
Marginalized Likelihood Ratio (MLR) test is somewhat related to the GLR test. The
MLR test for failure detection is claimed in [22] to have several advantages compared to
GLR. It is stated in [22] that the MLR test has the following features
* There is no sensitive threshold to choose in MLR.
* The MLR test is robust to modeling error of noise variances.
* The MLR requires lower level of computational complexity for off-line application.
The hypotheses used for failure detection in the MLR test are the same as those of the
GLR test. Even the LLR of both algorithm expressions are the same. The LLR of both
the MLR test and the GLR test is given as
N *, v= p(yNHi(r*, v)) (3.51)11 p(yNIHo)
for the observation yN = {yi, Y2,- ., XN}. In the GLR test, v is replaced by the maximum
likelihood estimate of v, v(r*), while in the MLR test, v is considered as a random variable.
Marginalization of the probability density function from the numerator given in (3.51) over
v makes the probability density independent of v as given in the following equation :
p(e)= ) p(ENIv)p(v)dy. (3.52)
The LLR of the MLR test in Equation (3.51) shows that the numerator is the condi-
tional probability of the observations. After marginalizing the conditional probability of
the numerator, the following LLR will be obtained :
l N (*, v) = 2 In p(yNIH (r*)) (3.53)p(yNIHO)
There are two ways for assigning the prior probability p(v) [22], [23]. First, p(u) is
assumed to have a Gaussian distribution. Second, p(v) is assumed to have infinite invari-
ance, in which the p(v) is given a constant value. The second approach is considered as a
non-informative problem.
Developing the Equation (3.53) will give us the following results
max 2 1np(yNI r * v)
N(*) = arg max 2 p(yNn - In Ri (71*)1 + Cprior(T*)
v p(yN)
= lN(7"*,~(Tr*)) - In iRN(-r*)I + Cprior(7*) (3.54)
The quantities from the GLR test are used in Equation (3.54). Those quantities are given
in Equations (3.45) , (3.46).
When we assume that the prior probability density of v is a constant, we will have Cprior (T*)
given by
Cprior(7*) = 0. (3.55)
If we choose the Gaussian distribution as the density of v such that
v E N(vo,P,)
then the value of Cprior(7*) will be given by
Cprior (*) = -log IPI + (iN(7*) - y)T Pv ' (DN(7*) - v0) (3.56)
Appendix B.5 will provide the derivation of the MLR test. The process of marginaliza-
tion from conditional probability for each prior probability density for v is shown therein.
3.4 Two-Filter Implementation of The MLR Test
The GLR test requires a lot of computing resource for exploring the maximation process.
The MLR test, however, can be arranged such that it is computationally efficient. Especially
for off-line application, the MLR test only requires two filters, [20], [22], [21]. One filter
executes forward processing in time, while the other executes backward processing in time.
Under certain circumstances, by allowing a certain amount of delay, the two-filter MLR test
can be applied on-line.
The following derivation of the MLR test will show how this algorithm can be imple-
mented by two filters only. The derivation in the sequel is different from what we saw in
the previous section.
From Bayes' rule we have
p(A, B) = p(AIB)p(B)
= p(BIA)p(A)
Based on that rule, the sequence of y' = {Ym+1, Ym+2, . - n-1, Yn} will have the proba-
bility expression as either
p(yn) = P(Ynlym, m+1,.. ,Yn-2, Yn-1)P(Ym,Ym+1,. .. ,Yn-2,Yn-1)
p(ynjn-1)P(Un-1)
= p(yt ly-m ) (3.57)
t=m
or
p(yn) = P(Ymlym+1,Ym+2, ... ,Yn-1, Yn)P(Ym+1, Ym+2,.. - - -,Yn-1,Yn)
p(ymly +i)(y +n)
= p(ytIlyt ) (3.58)
Reversing the order of the sequence does not change the probability p(y"). The probability
of measurements under the hypotheses that jump occurs at time 7* is
p(yNI*) = p(y~~r*).p(y 1 I7*, y ' *)
r* t
Figure 3-3: The density functions of observation before and after the jump
The conditional probability factors in Equation (3.59) become the marginal probability
factors. Figure 3.4 illustrates the probabilities involved for the event of failure. Before the
jump occur at time r*, the measurements are not affected by the presence of the jump.
Hence, p(y* *r*) = p(yT*). This factor is computed by
p(yT*) = 'y (yt -Hff _ HtT tt-1H+ RF + t) (3.60)
t=1
as it is shown in Appendix B.1. Note that -y(p, R) is a Gaussian distribution function with
mean value of p and covariance R. The computation is done by applying Kalman filter on
the forwards Markovian model.
The factor p(yN +lIr*, yT*) = p(yN+1 ) is computed from the reversed-time point of view.
This term is expanded backwards in time in the same way as the forward computation
case. Note that from the backward in time point of view, the probability distribution of
measurement before jump is (pT (r*), S), with T (r*) mean value and S covariance. The
probability density y(Tp (r*), S) is computed by
Np(y ) = 7 Yt - Ht tt_-1, Ht pt+ 1 Ht + RB + t) (3.61)
t=7*+1
The Kalman filter applied in backward model will give t +1 and PtBt+l"
The Kalman filter running backward applies the same algorithm given in the Equa-
tion (3.12). Modification, however, should be applied for the dynamic matrix and the
covariance matrix, [47]. Appendix B.3 provides a description of how to modify the dynamic
matrix of the state space and the covariance matrix from the given state-space dynamic
system, running forward in time.
3.5 Numerical Examples
We consider now a numerical example to illustrate how to apply the failure detection al-
gorithms : GLR - MLR - 2-filter MLR to a discrete-time linear dynamic system. The
simplified model of the inertial system heading gyro error,
X = (3.62)
X2
Y = y (3.63)
Xt+l = Xt + b wt (3.64)
0 1- b2
Yt= [1 0 ]Xt+et (3.65)
will be used with the following numerical values ' = 1, Tg -+ oo, bl = 0.5 and b2 = 1. This
model is taken from [36]. For information, ; is the sampling period, and -r9 is the gyro error
time constant. The initial state X 0, the disturbance noise wt and the measurement noise et
have the following covariance matrices :
1000 0
cov[Xo,Xo] = (3.66)
0 1000
cov[wt, wt] = 1 (3.67)
cov[et, et] = [1 ] (3.68)
In the first simulation, the failure of impulse type is injected at time t = 25. The system
dynamic simulation is run from t = 0 - t = 50. The residual generated from the Kalman
time
Figure 3-4: The residual from the Kalman filter
filter is presented in Figure 3-4. We see in Figure 3-4 that approximately at the time when
failure occurs, the residual has the highest magnitude. The residual is eventually processed
to give the decision function presented in Figure 3-5. At time t = 25, the time when failure
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time
Figure 3-5: The decision function from the GLR test
occurs, the decision function from the GLR test gives the maximum value.
The MLR test relies on the result from the GLR. The MLR test's decision function is a
shifted version of the GLR test's result in magnitude. As we can see in Figure 3-6, for the
Gaussian prior, it has the same form as that of Figure 3-5, however, the magnitude of the
decision function envelope is amplified drastically at the time of impulse.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time
Figure 3-6: The decision function from the MLR test - Gaussian prior
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time
Figure 3-7: The decision function from the MLR test - constant prior
If the probability density of the failure is assumed constant, the decision function of the
MLR test will look like that of Figure 3-7. Still, amplification of the envelope from the
original GLR test underlies the MLR test.
The decision function given by the MLR test with two-filter implementation is slightly
different from the previous tests. The magnitude of the decision function goes below zero
and at the time when the failure occurs, it gives the impulse-type decision as is given in
Figure 3-8
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Figure 3-8: The decision function from the 2-filter MLR test
The behavior of failure detection algorithms with respect of the location of the failure
inside the buffer of observation is also presented here. In this simulation, failure time is
varied from the beginning of the buffer or window of observation, i.e. t = 0, to the end
of the buffer, i.e. t = 50. A Monte-Carlo method was used for this simulation. Only two
algorithms are compared here, excluding the MLR test. The GLR test and the 2-filter MLR
test provide a significant different from each other, while the MLR test is basically the GLR
with amplification. The results of this study are presented in Figures 3-9 and 3-10.
Figure 3-9 shows that the GLR test provide good performance in tracking the failure
time. Even when the time failure is at the beginning of the buffer or at the end of the
buffer, the GLR test still can identify the failures. The decision function space of the GLR
test excluding the region of failure stays approximately at the same value as we can see in
Figure 3-9.
The 2-filter MLR test, however, requires different threshold for each different failure
time. Additional filtering is required for identification of failure time in the 2-filter MLR
0.5-
0
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time of failure 0 0time of detection
Figure 3-9: The decision function from the GLR test-various failure time
test since as the time of failure varies, the mean of the detection function as well as the
magnitude of the peak of the detection function within the observation interval change. As
we can see in Figure 3-11, the contour of the decision function is very noisy due to the
variation of the mean of detection space as the time of failure changes. For each failure
time k, as we normalize the decision function through the following equation :
lt(k, I(k)) = It(k, I(k)) + inf lt(k, P(k)), (3.69)
ti <t<tf
we will obtain the decision function space given in Figure 3-13 with its contour given in
Figure 3-12. The normalized detection space is now smoother. This indicates that the
decision function does not require adaptive threshold. We can see in Figure 3-12 that
the common threshold facilitates the detection function to identify the location of failure
whatever the location of failure within the window of observation.
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Figure 3-10: The decision function from the 2-filter MLR-various failure time
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Figure 3-11: The contour decision function from the 2-filter MLR test
____ _ __~__ __
E30 Y
16 25
E
20
15 -
5
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time of detection
Figure 3-12: The contour of function from the normalized 2-filter MLR test
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Figure 3-13: The normalized decision function from the 2-filter-MLR test for various failure
time
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Chapter 4
Deterministic Failure Detection
Algorithm
The failure detection algorithms described in this chapter are developed based on a different
approach from what was given in Chapter 3. These algorithms are derived deterministically,
meaning that no probability model is assigned to characterize the unknown or undermined
quantities. The deterministic algorithm for failure detection discussed in this chapter is
developed in such a way that it still functions under the worst possible combination of
unknowns in both the system model and the process noise model, on the assumption that
the unknowns are within strict bounds. This algorithm is a result of the research work by
Mangoubi [31].
In Section 4.1, the problem of generating robust residuals is presented. A number of
estimators that have been developed recently provide an estimate of the system dynamic
states under the worst possible condition of unknown or uncertain quantities. One of those
filters resulting from the research of Appleby [2], is discussed in section 4.2. This section
explores how this filter works to generate residuals through a numerical example. The main
discussion of this chapter is the deterministic failure detection algorithm, which is discussed
thoroughly in section 4.3. At the end of this chapter, numerical examples demonstrate the
application of this deterministic algorithm.
4.1 Robust Residuals
The role of residuals in failure detection was explored in Chapter 3. Using the measure-
ment residual et for hypothesis testing rather than the measurement yt has the following
advantages :
* et contains the same statistical information as yt, relative to failure detection,
* et is not correlated in time, while yt is,
* using et reduces the complexity of LLR computation,
The residual Et as defined in Chapter 3 is generated by a Kalman filter. In the re-
search work of Appleby, [2], [3], it is shown that the Kalman filter performance degrades
in generating residuals when there is uncertainty in system modeling and process noise
modeling.
Several methods have been developed to provide estimators that are robust in the pres-
ence of model uncertainties, as described in [2], [3] and the references therein. Performance
comparison of these estimators to the Kalman filter also can be found in the research works
of Appleby [2], [3], and Mangoubi [32]. For the system :
xt+l = Axt + But + wt
Yt = Cxt + Dut + et
the robust estimator will generate the estimated xt, 1 t which will have the following dy-
namics:
t+1 = Ait + K (Yt - Ct) + But
rt = t - Cit.
The quantity rt is denoted as the robust residual, since it is generated by the robust esti-
mator.
The uncertainties in the system model and the process noise model will introduce errors
in estimation. These errors will be reflected in residuals. The robust estimators are designed
so as to minimize the error due to the uncertainties in both the system model and the process
noise model. For failure detection purpose, the residuals carry the following information :
* errors in estimation,
* failure information.
It is expected that the use of the robust estimator will give residuals that carry failure
information only.
An initial study of applying robust residuals for LLR computation is given in the work
of Mangoubi [32). It is shown therein that the performance of robust estimators is better
than that of the residuals from the Kalman filter when there are unknown parameters. The
next section will describe the idea of using a robust estimator to generate the residuals
for failure detection. This section precedes the main discussion of the deterministic failure
detection algorithm, RFDI.
4.2 Robust H, Filter for Residual Generation
To design an estimator for a linear dynamic system given by the following state-space
equations :
Xt+1 = (A + AA)xt + (B + AB)ut + wt
yt = (C + AC)xt + (D + AD)ut + et
we often use the matrices A, B, C, D to estimate the state xt with the following estimator :
Pt+l = At+K(yt-C t) + But
rt = yt - Ct.
The reliability of state estimate It given by the estimator working on the nominal model,
therefore, becomes a question.
The Hoo filter was developed to provide estimates of plant states under the worst case
noise and plant modeling errors. These filters or estimators provide robust guaranteed
estimation with respect to those modeling errors.
The residuals can be described by the following equation :
rt = rt + rt
where r' corresponds to error in estimation and rt corresponds to the failure information.
For failure detection, it is expected that
frt , rt
Robust residual is expected to have the aforementioned properties.
In this section, we explore the use of an H. filter for failure detection. The H, filter
used is the one developed by Appleby [2], [3]. The output from the filter is then processed
to generate a residual vector. The residual vector is then used in the GLR algorithm given
in Chapter 3 for failure detection problems. This approach follows, in part, the framework
given in section 3.1.
The availabity of the MATLAB computational software package makes it straightfor-
ward to develop an H, filter. We need to formulate the problem in a standard form, and
MATLAB will then produce the gains for the robust filter.
For a given dynamic system with the following state-space equations :
= Ax(t)+ [ B 01[ ](t)
= Mx(t)
= Cx(t) + O w(t)
2 e(t)
* z(t): system states,
* w(t): process noise,
* e(t): measurement noise,
* z(t) : performance vector,
* A : dynamic matrix,
* B1 : process noise matrix,
z(t)
y(t)
where
* B2: measurement noise matrix,
* M : performance matrix,
the estimator will be described by the following equations:
Xi(t) = A.(t) + Ko(y(t) - (t))
~(t)
~(t)
=M~i(t)
=ci(t)
To solve the problem with MATLAB, we need to construct the following matrix :
A B
P=
C D
where
A=A
3 = [B 0 0
C
0 0
The MATLAB command hinfsyn from the p-Synthesis Toolbox,
bound of y which is associated with the level of uncertainties, [18].
used to construct the following Hamiltonian matrix
will provide the lower
This y is immediately
-CT(B 2BT)-IC + IMT M
-A
For the Hamiltonian matrix Hy, there is an associated Riccati equation of the following
form :
AY,+± YAT ± Y [0 (B 2B T)-1C + IMTM Y 0 - (B 1 BT) = 0
A
T
H y . T
-BHB
-B1B{
The MATLAB command ric_schr can be used to generate the solution of the Riccati
equation by inputting the corresponding Hamiltonian matrix structure. The solution of the
Riccati equation, Y,, determines the gain matrix K, :
K, = YC T. (B2BT) - 1
The following numerical example shows the performance of Appleby's H, filter in state
estimation. The residual vector from the Appleby's Ho filter is used for failure detection.
Figure 4-1: System dynamics and its estimates from Ho filter
Figure 4-2: The residual from HO filter
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Figure 4-3: The decision function of GLR using robust residual
Figure 4-1 shows a simulated output of the system described in Section 3.5. We use the
same system model as the one given in numerical example of Section 3.5. The system in
Section 3.5 is discrete-time while the Appleby's Ho filter works for continuous time system.
Transformation from the discrete-time system to the continuous-time system is performed
by forward-Euler rectangular method so that the dynamic matrix and the input matrix
become
0= [ 1
Acont =
0
Bcont = 1
Appleby's Ho filter is developed based on these nominal matrices Acont, Bcont, C and D.
What we see in Figure 4-1 is the state estimate dynamics, given by the solid lines, and
the perturbed system dynamics, given by the dotted lines. The perturbed system has a
different dynamic matrix A :
0.010 1.001
Aperturbed =
0.001 0.001
Figure 4-2 shows the residual generated by the Hoo filter. From this residual, the decision
function is illustrated by Figure 4-3. As in the previous numerical examples given in Section
3.5, the impulse jump is injected at time t = 25. We can see that the failure detection
algorithm, given the residual from the Ho filter, can still provide correct signal of failure
in the presence of modeling errors.
4.3 Robust Failure Detection Filter
The Robust Failure Detection Filter - RFDI - is developed based on a deterministic ap-
proach. The uncertainties that accompany the failure detection process are considered and
treated in the worst case sense. In [31], it is claimed that the RFDI algorithm can account
for several categories of modeling uncertainties, i.e. :
* noise and plant model uncertainties,
* failure model uncertainties,
* statistical outliers or contaminated noise.
The discussion of RFDI, based on the compilation of [33], [34], [35], [31], will be carried
out step by step. First, the robust estimator for a system with uncertainty in process noise
model will be presented in Section 4.3.1. Second, the robust estimator for both system
model and process noise model will be given in Section 4.3.2. Finally, in Section 4.3.3,
the RFDI algorithm that considers uncertainties of system model, process noise model and
failure model will be discussed. The RFDI algorithm applies the robust estimator given in
Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Robust Estimator for Systems with Uncertain Process Noise Model
In the estimation problem, estimator F tries to mimic the dynamic behavior of plant P as
illustrated in Figure 4-4. In the presence of input disturbance r and uncertainty of initial
condition xo, the estimator F, given the measurement yt and an estimate of initial condition
o, reconstructs the state 2 of the system P.
For a deterministic estimator, the initial state x0 and the disturbance r are characterized
by a certain set description, rather than their stochastic attributes. The description of
characterizing noise by a certain set is given in Paganini's Ph.D thesis [37].
Ar P A F x
xo - xo-- o
Figure 4-4: The estimation problem of plant dynamic
Before proceeding to the formulation
the following terms :
of the robust estimation problem, we introduce
r = [ro,.. ,rN_1]
y = [yo,.. ,YN-11]
e = [e 1,...,eN]
Note that each vector has finite time dimension N which
lem. The following norm descriptions are used
constitutes a finite-horizon prob-
N-1
lirli = (Skrk) 2
k=O
N
IIII = (1YTYk)
k=1
N-1
Ilell = (E efek)2
k=0
A robust estimator is developed in such a way that the state estimate :t will have
minimum error in the presence of a worst-case disturbance r and a worst-case initial state
estimation error x0 - o. The problem can be illustrated by Figure 4-5
r
x- xo
e
Figure 4-5: The robust estimator problem
Let G be a mapping from rt and x 0 - io to et, or
: rt, xo - o -+ et
et = 9(rt, Xo - o) (4.1)
The problem of robust estimation is to construct an estimator such that the function norm
g is minimized in the worst-case combination of rt and x0 - o. Minimizing the function
norm is equivalent to minimizing the 2-norm of g. Mathematically, this problem can be
stated as
11212 = sup e112 (4.2)
(r,xo-io)#O + | I| o - oi p- 1
= sup Ile112 (4.3)
fily j2+ jj O < 1}{lIrII2+I/xo-ioiI 1<11
IIgII2 < K2 (4.4)
The estimator is developed for P that has the following state-space description :
Xt+l = Atxt + Btrt (4.5)
et = Mt (xt - :t) (4.6)
Yt = Ctt + Dtrt (4.7)
To obtain the optimal solution of the criterion given in equation (4.4), with system dy-
namics described by equations (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) are treated as constraints, a game theoritic
approach is used for optimization. Appendix C.1 will provide a thorough derivation for a
robust estimator with the uncertainty in noise model.
Now, we are ready to formulate the robust estimator for uncertain noise model.
For the linear time-varying system described by the following state-space equations
Xt+l = Atxt + Btrt
et = Mt(t - et)
Yt = Ctxt + Dtrt
with initial condition xo and initial error eo = xo - -o, the robust estimator for known
system dynamics and unknown noise model will be
xt+l = (At - KtCt)&t + Ktyt (4.8)
Kt = [BtD + AtH- CT][DtDT + CtHI CT]-  (4.9)
Ht = P- 1 - - 2MT Mt (4.10)
At = At- KtCt (4.11)
B = Bt- KtDt (4.12)
Pt+1 = At H AT + tBT (4.13)
Po = Po> 0 (4.14)
The equation (4.8) is the standard form of an estimator equation, with gain Kt given by
equation (4.9), and noise covariance propagation given in equation (4.13). When we take
the limit of 7, such that :
lim Ht = Pt 1
y-40oo
then we obtain the Kalman filter algorithm. In this case, 7 reflects the uncertainty in noise
model.
4.3.2 Robust Estimator for System with Uncertain System Model and
Process Noise Model
The problem of estimation in the presence of uncertainties in both the system model and the
process noise model is the generalization of the problem given in Section 3.1. This problem
can be illustrated by Figure (4-6) There are two additional variables in Figure (4-6),
A
y x
Xo - xo
Figure 4-6: The estimation problem with uncertainties in system and noise models
77 = [o7,... ,77N-1]
= [6io,...,N 1]
with their norms are defined by
N-1
117711 = (Z77kk)
k=0
N-1
k=0
These variables will be included in the optimization process. As for the previous discussion
in Section 3.1, all variables are defined over a finite time interval.
For the general case, the robust estimator will minimize the induced operator G that
maps the input disturbance rt and initial estimation error x0 - o0 to the estimation error
et, for all possible model perturbations A of bounded induced 2-norm. The performance
index for this problem is given by the following equations :
IgII2 sup le112 (4.15)
2 sl7112I i2 2 (4.16)
VA Ia l- 2  = sup < (4.17)
The system dynamics given by the following state-space equations
Xt+1 = Atxt + Btdt (4.18)
Et = Stxt + Tkdt (4.19)
et = Mt(xt - it) (4.20)
Yt = Ctxt + Dtdt (4.21)
dt = [rT  Ti7T (4.22)
will act as constraints in the optimization problem of equation (4.16).
In the state-space equations (4.18) - (4.22) that describe the system dynamics and its
uncertainty, we see that there are two new matrices S and T. These matrices describe how
the uncertainties enter into the system. In general, the system with uncertainties can be
described by the following state-space equations :
Xt+1 = At + E AAjt,
Yt H Hj=1
Yt = Ht + EA Hjtj
j=1
xt + (Gt
xt + (Et
k
j=1
k
+ Z AEjtyj rt
j=1
where k indicates the order of uncertainties. Note that the state-space equations in (4.23)
and (4.24) are time-varying. For each uncertainty j, we can construct the concatenated
matrix Njt E R(dim(x)+dim(y)) x (dim(x)+dim(r)) in the following way :
Nit = AA
AHy~
It is possible to decompose matrix Njt into
AGjt
AEjt
(4.25)
Nj = [J] x Sjt Ljt
LRjt
(4.26)
where
SQjt E dim(x)xrank(N j t )
" Rjt E dim(y)xrank(N j t)
* Sit C rank(Nj,)xdim(x)
* Ljt E rank(Njt)xdim(r)
Recall that dt = [lt rt].
Qj , Rj ,, Sjt and Ljt matrices
The equations (4.23) and (4.24) are now rewritten with
included :
(4.27)Xt+1 = At + E Qjtj, 6 rank(Nit)xrank(Nit)S j t Xt( kj=1
+ Gt + E Qj6j rank(Njt)xrank(Njt)L Jt rt
j=1
(4.23)
(4.24)
= Atxt [ Qi, ... Qk,
rit
+ Gtrt
rk
= Atxt + Qtrt + Gtrt
= Atxt + Btdt
(4.28)
k 1
E+ jiR 'IrankA(Nt)xrank(Nt)Sj t Xt
j=1
+ Et + k RjtjIrank(Njt)xrank(NJt)L)t rt
j=1
= Htxt + [ Rlt ... Rkt
- Htxt + Rtt + Etrt
SHtxt + Dtdt
t lt
[kt
Sit
S t + Ork +
SkTtdt
= Stxt + Ttdt
Lit
rt
Lkt
(4.29)
0 Lt1
0 Lkt
The relationship between lt and et is then described by
lt = [
=-Act
Yt = (Ht
lilt
+ Etrt
Il~
where
(4.30)
Elt
(Ekt
(4.31)
(4.32)
Tt
The following 2-dimension continuous system is given to illustrate how to construct the
uncertainty matrices. In this example, the system is time-invriant, so we can drop the
subscript "t" off the equations. This example is taken from [2].
Suppose we have the following state-space equations :
E (t)
i(t)
y(t)
0
mo
1 xI(t) o w(t)
0 e(t)J L
= Aox(t) + Bod(t)
= [1 0] l2(t) [0 1] (t)[ (2]
y = Hox(t) + Dod(t)
where the subscript "0" indicates the nominal values. Suppose we have the knowledge that
the parameter values are within certain ranges, i.e.,
m mo
b = bo+w 262
k = ko + 36 3
where
-1 < Jj < 1
and wj describes the distance from the nominal value to
The uncertainties appear in b, - and mathematically,
mi ,
its maximum and minimum values.
these can be described as
= [bo + w 2 2 ] x
= o + bow 61
mo
1L1 +161
+ 2 j2 + 0(6 2)
mo
S[ko + W3A 3 ]X [ 16 1
[M()
= k + kow 161 + w63 + 0(62).
m0 mo
Using the description of these uncertainties, ignoring the higher order terms, we rewrite the
matrices A, B, H, and D as
0 11 0
mo mo -kowl
62 +
0
-bow
63
A = Ao + AA+AA2 + AA 3
01
o00
S0
0
0
0 0
W 1 0
61 + Q62 + 063
B = Bo + AB + AB 2 + AB 3
= [ 1 0 ] 6 1 + 62  6 3
H = Ho+AH + AH2+AH3
] = [0 1] + 1 + 62 + 06 3
D = Do+ADi+AD2 +AD 3
The matrix Nj, for each j uncertainty is described by
AA 1
AH 1
AB 1
AD1
k
m
-
N =
0 0 00
-= kowl -bol w 0
0 0 0 0
AA 2
AH2
0
0
A
N3 =
AH
0
0
AB2
AD 2
0 0 0
W2 0 0
mo
0 0 0
3 AB 3
F3 AD 3
000
-000
000
0Matrices N 1 , N2 , N 3 are then decomposed into their corresponding matrices Qj, Rj, Sj and
L for each uncertainty mode j :
R [= 0
Q2 =
U)2
R2 = 0]
Q3 = ,
W3
R3 = 0
S =[-ko -bo], L=[1 0o]
S2=[ 1,] L2 =[o
$= 10 -o '
o]
o]0 L3 =[0 0]
N2
s -- 1
mo
The concatenated matrices of Q, R, S and T are
Q = [Q
R = [ R1
SS =
S = S2
S3
0 L1
T =- 0 L2
0 L3
Q2 Q3]
R 2 R3 ]
-ko
0
1
0
0
0
0 0
W2 W3
0 o]
-bo
1
Mimo
0
1 0
0 0
0 0
The approach used in [31] to solve the optimization problem is by treating rl as input
and E as output variables. The new problem now can be illustrated by Figure (4.3.2) The
r-
,eXO-
Figure 4-7: The general optimization in estimation problem
new formulation of the optimization problem is to minimize the following performance index
sup
(r,r,xo,xo-:o) A r 2 +
Ile112 + 1112
11112 + IlXoIIo + 0lio - o i o < K
2
Note the following facts :
* J1 < r 2 implies
Ile112 + I 112 < K2(IIr 112 + 2+ IIXII + xo - Po -1)
XO Po-
J1 = (4.33)
* the bound on perturbation A and the condition Pi, < 1 give
117112 < 0211 2112
117112 < n-211 11
2.
* These facts will lead to the following inequalities
Ie 2 + i1c112 2( r12 2 + IIxoII + IIxo - 01 o 1)
1le112 + I1112 < K2(Ir 2 + K-2 1112 + IIxolIo + Ixo - ~oIl-)
g2 2
i2 <
This means that working on the J1 performance index for the optimization problem will
solve the optimization with respect to minimizing 1111 . In appendix C.2 , we will see how a
game theoritic approach is used to solve the optimization problem of equation (4.33) subject
to the constraints given by equations (4.18)- (4.22). We will present the solution here.
In the general estimation problem, where the uncertainties exist in the system model and
noise model, the robust estimator of the linear time-varying system :
Xt+1 = Atxt + Btdt
Et = Stt + Tkdt
et = Mt(xt - xt)
Yt = Ctxt + Dtdt
dt [rT 7rT]T (4.34)
will be given by the the following equations :
it+l = (At- KtCt)it + Ktyt (4.35)
Kt= [BtDT + AtH-lt ][DtT + CtH- ]-  (4.36)
kR = ,-l- 7-2MtiMt (4.37)
Pt+l = (At-KtC(t)( - K(A tCt)T
±(Bt - KtDt)(Bt - KtDt)T (4.38)
Po = Po (4.39)
where
At = At + y-2Bt Z 1 F (4.40)
Bt = BtZt 2 (4.41)
Ct = Ct + 7-2Dt Z FtT  (4.42)
1
Dt = DtZ 2. (4.43)
The quantities Ft and Zt are defined as follows
Ft = STTt + ATXt+1 Bt (4.44)
Zt = I - -2(TTT + BTXt+iBt) (4.45)
where Xt is the solution of the following Riccati equation
Xt = ATXt+1 At + STSt + -2FtZ1 Ft (4.46)
XN = 0 (4.47)
The Riccati equation given in equation (4.46) runs backward in time. This situation is
very similar to the LQR problem whose Riccati equation should be solved in reversed time.
It is still possible, however, to apply this algorithm on-line. The intermediate sequence Xt
can be computed off-line knowing only the plant matrices and the disturbance matrices.
This method of solving backward Riccati equation for real-time application is given in [30].
The method for real-time robust estimation application is illustrated by Figure 4-8.
The robust estimator that has been derived is related to the Kalman filter. It is obvious
that taking the limit of 7 -+ oc will give the following quanitities
lim At = At
-y-oo
lim Bt = Bt
y-oo
lim Ct = Ct7---+oo
lim Dt = Dt
On-line
S Computation
Off-line
Computation
Eqs.4.44-4.47
Figure 4-8: On-line application of robust estimator
lim Ht Pt -'
-y-+oo
The robust estimator again returns to the Kalman filter. It is clear now that the Kalman
filter will provide the best estimate of xt under the absence of the system model and noise
model uncertainties.
4.3.3 The General RFDI
Robust Failure Detection and Isolation - RFDI was developed to be sensitive to the presence
of a failure while remaining robust to failure mode, noise and plant model uncertainties.
In [35], it is shown that the RFDI has wider robustness coverage compared to the existing
failure detection algorithms.
This algorithm applies the robust estimator, developed in Section 3.2 in its failure de-
tection scheme. The failure in the RFDI scheme is treated as an output vector of a dynamic
system. The dynamics model of failure is assumed to be a shaping filter driven by white
noise. Hence, the failure shaping filter has the following Gauss-Markov model :
qt+i = Aft t + Bft t (4.48)
vt = Cft t (4.49)
where t is the white noise driving the failure shaping filter and vt is the failure that enters
the plant. The RFDI can be illustrated by Figure 4-9, with Pf is the shaping filter driven
by the white noise (t producing the output vt.
ALP y decision
_ v F Test
x
Figure 4-9: Representation of RFDI algorithm
The failure dynamic system in equations (4.48) - (4.49), from a deterministic point of
view, is driven by bounded 12-norm of (t and has an 12-bounded o0. The same system, from
a stochastic point of view, is driven by a unitary white-noise t with unit variance, and b0
has zero mean and covariance Qp.
The failure, in the form of a jump, is a special form of the system described in equa-
tions (4.48) - (4.49). In this particular case, the model will be
0t+1 = Ct (4.50)
vt = /t (4.51)
where Q0 = oc.
Representing the failure in this fashion is not the only way. In Hall's thesis [25], the
algorithm for failure detection called Orthogonal Series GLR - OSGLR, all failure modes are
represented by orthogonal series of Laguerre or Legendre functions. The idea is developed
based on the principle that the orthonormal bases span the failure space. All failure modes
can be described by combination of each orthonormal basis. This approach is not explored
here since the OSGLR algorithm requires more states to represent each failure [31].
The problem of hypothesis testing with the RFDI can now be formulated as follows.
For the hypotheses:
Ho: xt+l = Atxt + Qt?7t + Bt + Utut
ft = Stzt + Ttrt
Yt = Ht + Rtrt + Dtrt + Wtut,
HI : Xt+l = Atxt + Qtt + Bt + Utut + Gtvt
Et = Stxt + Tt
Yt = Ht + Rtt + Dtrt + Wtut + Ltvt,
the RFDI algorithm is applied by treating the system of Figure 4-9 as an augmented system.
The plant state-space equations and the shaping filter state-space are augmented to give
the following state-space equations :
xt+l = Atxt + GtCftqt + Qtrt + Btrt + Utut
Ot+1 = Aftet + Bf,t
or, in a more compact form :
rt
=t+1 At GtCf ] t ][Bt Qt Ut 0 
-t (4.52)
with initial estimate
x[ (4.53)
0 0
The matrices Gt and Lt describe the way the failure enters the system states and measure-
ments. When the failure enters the states, then it is considered as actuator failures, while
if the failure enters the measurements, then it is considered as sensor failures.
For a stochastic approach, the initial error is a zero mean and has a covariance given by
Po = (4.54)
0 Q0
While for a deterministic point of view, the initial estimation error has a weighted Euclidean
norm, with weight given by Po 1.
The associated observaton equation is given by :
LtCft
+
Rt Dt Wt 0O
O 0 0 0
rt
77t
ut
G
(4.55)
To put the augmented system into the RFDI framework, we define the following matrices
first :
A= [At
0
i3' Bt
0
S=[ Ht
D = [ Rt
AGt
Qt Ut 0
0 0 Bft
LtCf, ]
Dt Wt 0].
(4.56)
(4.57)
(4.58)
(4.59)
Hence, following the form of the robust estimator given in Section 4.3.2,
= (At - Kct) 1 + KtYt (4.60)
(4.61)S[BtbT + AtH-IT][DtT + CtHCTI -
At = At +t-2BtZ Fe (4.62)
1
Bt = BtZt 2 (4.63)
Ot = Ot + 7-2btZ-1 FT (4.64)
1
Dt = DtZ 2 (4.65)
Ft = STT + ATXt+lBt (4.66)
Z t = I - -
2(TT ± TXt+lBt) (4.67)
HIt = PM -t-2 TMt (4.68)
The following two Riccati equations will give the positive definite solutions for Xt and Pt.
Yt
vt
t+
kt+1
Re
Xt = AX+ t + sTst + <-2FtZtEF[
Xtf=N = 0
Pt+1 = (At- tCt)Hf-1(At -tCt)T
+(Bt - KtDt)(Bt - KtDt)T
Po = P
(4.69)
(4.70)
(4.71)
(4.72)
We now define several quantities before proceeding to describe the decision function. Defin-
ing the following vectors :
Ta 
=
v [V_ =  iI,...
(4.73)
(4.74)
CG
= CAG
CAtf -ti-1 G
E = cov [Yo, Yo]
The decision function will be given by
D = log
CG
CAtf -ti-2G
exp -YT(Eo + gEgT)-]
exp [-YTEoY]
= -YT [(E + gE T)-l - E1] y + Cconst
If we apply the matrix inversion lemma, such that
= o - COI(Tol + E)-ITo1
= -- g(gTI -10-l 0yT 1
= 0
(4.75)
CG L
(4.76)
+ Cconst
(Eo + VgT) - 1
then we will have, apart from the constant term,
E = yTEO GEyGT E y (4.77)
If what we have is the estimate of v, we use the following equation
tf
D = Z f TSk k (4.78)
k=ti
For accurate models, Sk is the S 1, the error covariance matrix from the Kalman filter.
For deterministic model with uncertainties, it is claimed in [35] that it is a matrix of free
parameters, whose selection is an open issue.
4.4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we use the same 2-dimension system as in Section 3.5. We will explore the
algorithm for two cases. For the first case, we assume that we know the model accurately,
but we do not have good knowledge of the noise model. For the second case, we assume
that both system model and noise model are not known precisely.
Case 1: Unknown noise model. The failure model is assumed to have the following
model:
Ot+i = qt
vt = Ot.
The augmented system dynamic equations are then described by :
1 1 5 0.5 0
S0 1 10 + 1 0 rt
0 0 1 0 0
Yt = 1 0 0 + 0 1 rt
where rt = [wt et]T. For simulation, the following quantities are used
to 0
to 0
1000 0
PXt0 0 1(000 0
0 10000
=5
To simulate this system, we follow the algorithm from equation (4.8) - (4.13). The outputs
of the estimator with no failure are shown in Figure 4-10. With the absence of failure, we
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Figure 4-10: Robust estimation in
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can see that the third state, X3, is zero after the transient period. The second state, x2
is not estimated very well due to the fact that we only measure the first state xl. The
estimator tracks the first state, xl, quite well, even though a small y is used. Using higher
y will give a better estimation.
In the presence of failure, the detection function is given by the following equation :
t=tf
Df = VtP3 -3 Vt
t=to
where P33 , is the (3, 3) - th entry of matrix P from equation (4.13). The decision function
for jump failure is given in Figure 4-11 and the ramp failure is presented in Figure 4-12.
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Figure 4-11: Decision function of jump failure
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Figure 4-12: Decision function of ramp failure
The use of inverted P33t suppresses the transient response which is significantly large.
The decision functions of both ramp failure and jump failure do not grow instantly. If the
delay does not affect the whole performance of the system, this algorithm would be an
alternative for real-time applications.
Case 2: Unknown dynamics and noise model . We still use the same model of
failure dynamics. Suppose that we have uncertainties in time constant T9 and sampling rate
( from the system model. The corresponding matrix N1 and N 2 will be
0
0 0
000
000
0 0 000
0 0 000
0 0
0 110000
0 0
000
000
000
0 0 000
After decomposition, we obtain the following matrices
Q1 = 0 ,SI = 00 , ] Li=[ 0 0
0
Ri= [o]0
0
Q2 = 1, S2 = 0 0 ] L2 =0 0
0
R2 = 10
N-
N 2
The matrices Qi and the matrices Ri, i = 1, 2, are concatenated with matrices B and D.
The new system dynamics will be :
1 1 5
0 1 10 +
00 1
Yt = [1 0 0- + 0
1/2 0 1 0
1 001
0 000
1 0 0 7i
[ 2t
There is an additional Riccati
matrices S and T, given by
equation that has to be solved for this second case. The
S =
T=
0 0100
0 1 010000
0000
are used to solve the second Riccati equation. The Riccati equation
Xtf
Xt
= 0
SATXt+I A +TS + -2FtZ t FtT
together with
Ft = STT + AXt+I
Zt =I- 
-2 (TTT + BTXt+±1 )
have to be solved first. These equations can be computed off-line before the whole process
begin. The computed values of Xt, Ft and Zt where t refers to the index inside the buffer
of computation, are eventually used to determine the estimate of the augmented system.
Figure 4-13 shows the performance of the estimator in the absence of failure. Even
Xt+1
t+1i
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Figure 4-13: The estimate of system dynamics : Case 2
though the estimation for x1 and the x2 is not very accurate, the estimates S1, 2, still
follow the dynamics of the states X 1, X2. We also see that the estimator provides good
estimate of failure at post-transient period.
Figure 4-14 presents the decision function of detection when jump failure is present, and
Figure 4-15 presents the decision function when ramp failure occurs. The decision functions
for both failure types are a function of the failure magnitude estimate, or X2 from the
state-space dynamic equation.
There is an interesting property that we see from both cases, the presence of detection
delay. In both cases, failures were injected at time t = 25, and the decision functions
for jump failure started increasing at t = 30, while the decision function for ramp failure
started increasing at approximately t = 35. This delay may cause problems, unless the
failure detection filter is set to give a decision after the whole computation of the decision
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time
Figure 4-14: The decision function for jump failure : Case 2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
time
Figure 4-15: The decision function for ramp failure : Case 2
function within the buffer of observation is completed.
Chapter 5
Application of Failure Detection
Algorithms
The algorithms for failure detection discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 were applied
to the problem of monitoring the aircraft cockpit instrument crucial for aircraft attitude
determination. The instrument configuration for aircraft attitude determination in this
experiment was minimum, in the sense that only two dissimilar sensors were used to pro-
vide the attitude information and the goal is to detect any disagreement between them.
This configuration is an effort to minimize the cost for reliable instruments. In the begin-
ning of this chapter, the background of experiment is introduced. The description of the
experiment, the result and the discussion are presented subsequently.
5.1 Background of Experiment : The Problem of Aircraft
Attitude Determination
Attitude determination - the way to determine vehicle's orientation with respect to a specific
coordinate system - is crucial for safe aircraft flight, especially when the horizon is obscured
by clouds or fog. Without a reference for aircraft attitude in this situation there is virtual
certainty that the pilot will lose control of the aircraft.
The straightforward solution to determine the aircraft attitude is to use a set of iner-
tial instruments. Typically, redundant instruments are used to achieve reliability. Multiple
gyroscopes are used to measure aircraft orientation angles. The word "multiple" is em-
phasized here to imply that the redundancy is applied for reliability. However, redundant
instruments are expensive and it is desirable to minimize the level of redundancy, especially
in general aviation aircraft.
The existence of GPS - Global Positioning Systems - provides another solution for atti-
tude determination. Cohen in [9] and [16] proposed multi-antenna GPS receiver for attitude
determination. The configuration is illustrated in Figure 5-1. During the research period of
1996-1997, the price of the multi-antenna GPS was still significantly high. This approach
was not explored during the research.
.\.. . .......  .
- ,, ........ ....../ ,Multi Antenna
Figure 5-1: Multi-Antenna GPS receiver for attitude determination
A different approach in utilizing the GPS for attitude determination is still under de-
velopment at MIT. Research work by Kornfeld [27] is exploring the minimum configuration
of single-antenna GPS and IMU - Inertial Measurement Unit - to determine the aircraft
attitude. The minimum configuration approach is illustrated in Figure 5-2. It is important
to monitor the integrity of the GPS-IMU measurements. When two measurements disagree,
the computer should be aware that there is a possibility that one of the instruments fails.
A failure detection system conducts the continuous integrity monitoring of the two instru-
ments. The failure detection system should inform the computer as correctly as possible
that there is a disagreement in the measurements and it is solely due to the instrument
failure, not other causes.
The failure detection algorithms: the GLR/MLR tests, the 2-filter MLR test and the
RFDI algorithms, were used to perform the integrity monitoring task for the single antenna
GPS and IMU configuration. In this experiment, these algorithms were used to evaluate
the measurements from the instruments used by Kornfeld. Although the instruments used
: __ I_ ____
Figure 5-2: Single-Antenna GPS receiver and IMU for attitude determination
for the experiment are the same as those used in Figure 5-2, the experiment was conducted
using an automobile rather than an aircraft. Figure 5-3 illustrates the configuration of the
instruments for the failure detection algorithm experiment. The result of the experiment
GPS Antenna GPS Antenna (for externally aided IMU)
Laptop: Data Acquisition
GPS Receivers, and Control
lnertial Sensors, and
Electronic C
Processings
(in the trunk)
Figure 5-3: Single-Antenna GPS receiver and IMU on automobile for failure detection
algorithm experiment
with the ground vehicle while not completely representative of the aircraft environment, is
expected to be applicable to the aircraft problem. On the ground vehicle, the GPS antennas
will suffer obstacles such as trees, roads, and tunnels. These problems will not be faced
in aircraft application. The similar situation, however, might occur when an aircraft flies
across mountains or hills, or when it turns so that the wings hinder the GPS receivers. The
point here is that in both ground vehicle and aircraft, there will be a period when the GPS
solution is not reliable due to some reasons. Hence, the failure detection performance on
the ground vehicle experiment result should be useful for the aircraft application.
J
5.2 Experiment
5.2.1 Hardware Installation and Data Acquisition Process
The two GPS antennas were installed at the top of the automobile. One antenna was used
by the NOVATEL GPS receiver, while the other was used by the MIGITS IMU. The IMU
is externally aided, that it uses the GPS information to enhance the performance of the
inertial measurements. The receivers, the inertial sensors, the electronic units were put in
the automobile trunk. Each instrument was controlled by a portable laptop computer. The
laptop also executed the data acquisition process. The software for data acquisition directed
the measurements from both the GPS and the IMU and gave the following quantities :
The GPS measurements :
1. acquisition time : in ms
2. the GPS time
3. the GPS latency
4. velocities in North - East - Down : in m.s - 1
5. the GPS solution status
6. the GPS velocity status
7. geographic location : longitude, latitude, altitude : in O
8. HDOP
9. VDOP
10. number of satellites observable by the GPS receiver
The IMU measurements :
1. acquisition time : in ms
2. velocities in North - East - Down : in m.s - 1
3. attitude angles :0, 0, 0 : in degree
4. geographic location : longitude, latitude, altitude : in degree
5. accelerations in body axes : ax, ay, az : in m.s - 2
6. angular rates : 0, , 4: in O.s-1
7. instrument status
The result of the measurements were stored in the laptop hard-disk. The data were then
used for the failure detection experiment.
The IMU provided the measurements of accelerations from three orthogonal axes re-
solved in body axes, while the GPS measurements gave the velocities in three orthogonal
axes resolved in North-East-Down (NED) axes. The transformation of a vector expressed
in body axes to the one expressed in NED axes requires the direction cosine matrix whose
entries are given by the IMU measurements. The relationship between measurements in
this experiment can be stated in the following equation :
b -b N E D
t = CNEDgt (5.1)
where
Sa b : the acceleration measurements in body axes from IMU
SatNED : the acceleration estimates from velocity measurements from the GPS receiver
* CNED : the direction cosine matrix which transforms a vector in NED axes to a vector
in body axes
The direction cosine matrix is given by :
cos 4 sine 0 cos 0
CbED = - sin 0 cosi 0 0
0 0 1 sin 0
cos 0 cos ¢'
sin q sin 0 cos 0 - cos q sin V
cos 0 sin 0 cos 0 + sin q sin 0
0 -sin 1
1 0 0
0 cos 0 0
cos 0 sin 4
sin q sin 0 sin 4 + cos
cos sin 0 sin - sin
0 0
cos sin 
-sin cosq
- sin 0
¢ cos ' sin ¢ cos 0
ScosO cos qcos
(5.2)
where
* : yaw angle
* 0 : pitch angle
* : roll angle
and i, 0, and q were obtained as outputs from the IMU. The CbED matrix is an orthogonal
matrix, so the inverse of CbED is its transpose. The CbNED, given by
CNED = [CED] - 1  [ ED]T (5.3)
was also used in the experiment to compare the performance of the failure detection algo-
rithms on either body axes or NED axes.
5.2.2 Failure Detection Algorithm Comparison
Using the data gathered from the IMU and the GPS measurements, a comparison of failure
detection algorithms was performed as shown in Figure 5-4. Three algorithms were used
to monitor the status of the instruments using the observation data. The observation data
stream was segmented and put into the buffer of observation. Each algorithm performed a
finite-horizon detection [31] which means that the failure detection algorithm searched for
failure time T* over a finite interval ti < T* < tf, where ti corresponds to the first data
within the buffer and tf is the last data within the buffer of observation.
Decision Function : DF-RFDI
Data GLRMLR Decision Function : DF-GLR/MLR
IMU -GPS TPerformance Analysis
Tests
Decision Function: DF-MLR-2
MLR-2-Filter
Figure 5-4: The structure of the experiment of failure detection algorithms with real mea-
surments
There were two types of failure; jump failure and ramp failure, that were injected to the
measurements of each axis. The injected failures had adjustable variables to observe the
sensitivity of the algorithms. For jump type failure, the sensitivity of each algorithm was
tested against the magnitude of failure, while for ramp type failure, the slope of the failure
was varied to test the sensitivity of the algorithms. Each algorithm performance in detecting
these failures from the measurements in each axis was compared. Time of detection is used
as a measure of detection capability of each algorithm. Undetected failure corresponds to
the time of detection tD = oc. Figure 5-5 shows the scenario of the experiment.
In addition to the detection capability, computational complexity of each algorithm was
also compared. The computational complexity refers to number of flops - floating point
operations - used by each algorithm in performing finite-horizon failure detection.
S Ramp Failure
Variable Slope
I Failure Detection Algorithm Decision Function
To Performance Analysis
Measurements
I Failure Detection Algorithm Decision Function
SJump Failure
Variable Magnitude
Figure 5-5: The scenario of experiment : failure injected measurements were analyzed by
each failure detection algorithm
5.2.3 Measurement Data and Preprocessing
The ground track of the vehicle during the experiment is given in Figure 5-6 and the altitude
variation of the vehicle is given in Figure 5-7. The experimental data was corrupted by
noise and spikes due to the quality of the measurements and a hardware problem in data
storage. The quality of measurements from the GPS receiver depends on the number of
satellites observable by the receiver and the constellation of the satellites. If the number
and geometry of satellites are not adequate, the receiver provides unreliable information as
well as warning signals indicating reception problems. When the satellite constellation is
such that satellites are not significantly separated in space, the receiver also gives a warning
of Geometric Dilution of Precision (GDOP) status [16]. In addition the data recording
system also experienced problems which introduced occasional errors in the recorded IMU
and GPS data. These problems could not be resolved during the time period available for
data acquisition so these errors were removed from the data before the data was introduced
into the failure detection algorithms. Figure 5-8 presents some typical raw measurement
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Figure 5-6: The gound track of the excursion used for the experiment
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Figure 5-7: The altitude variation of the excursion for the experiment
data and the corresponding GPS warning indicators. As can be seen the velocity data
contains both noise and spikes. At several points, the spikes occur at the same time as when
the number of observable satellites decreased as well as when the HDOP status increases.
HDOP, Horizontal Dilution of Precision indicates the variance of measurement in horizontal
plane. Other spikes were due to the data storage problem mentioned earlier.
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Figure 5-8: The typical raw measurement was corrupted by spikes in addition to noise
To remove the spikes in this preprocessing stage, the following algorithm was used :
di = di = di if di - di-1 < hthreshold (5.4)
di = di_1 otherwise
i = ti,...,tf
where d is the difference between the GPS and the IMU measurements, hthreshold is the
threshold used to remove the spikes. The idea of this algorithm is that two sets of measure-
ments from the GPS and the IMU should not disagree significantly. When they do disagree
significantly, then the spikes must have corrupted the measurements. It is not possible for
the measurement difference to rise or to drop beyond the given hthreshold. If it does then
the current measurement is replaced by the previous one. The change from d_-1 to dt be-
yond the hthreshold is associated with the presence of the spike. The hthreshold's were chosen
carefully so as to remove spikes but also so as not to reduce sensor noise.
While this is a significant problem for this experiment, there are two mitigating factors
for aircraft applications. First, because aircrafts fly above trees and highway overpasses,
the errors due to GPS signal loss will be far fewer in an aircraft than was the case for this
automobile experiment. Second, as the GPS constellation grows the HDOP and signal loss
problems are likely to be eliminated.
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Figure 5-9: The estimated accelerations from the GPS velocity measurements
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Figure 5-10: The accelerations from the IMU
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Figure 5-11: The attitude angles from the IMU
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Figure 5-12: The difference of accelerations from the IMU and accelerations from GPS
resolved in NED reference frame
The Kalman filters were developed to estimate accelerations from GPS velocities. Since
the GPS measurement output is velocity in NED axes, three Kalman filters were used three
components of vehicle accelerations. The following system model was used to derive the
acceleration in each of the three axes :
1 dt
Xt+1 = Xt + wt
0Yt
Yt = 1 0 xt + et
(5.5)
(5.6)
1
0.5
0
-0.5
-I
X 10
4
SI I I Ix 0
I I I I I I I I II
-!
COVN [Wt, WT]
COVE[Wt, WT]
COVD [Wt, WT]
covN[et, et]
covE[et, ej]
covD [et, e j]
COVN[XO, X0]
COVE[XO, XT ]
COVD[XO, x']
zNo
XEo
XDo
3.33 x 10- 6
5.00 x 10- 5
3.33 x 10- 7
5.00 x 10- 6
3.33 x 10-8
5.00 x 10- 7
= 10 - 2
10-3
10 -
4
S 1000 0
0 1000
S 1000 0
0 1000
1000 0
0 1000
= [10 1 0 1T
= [10 1 0 ]T
-
[10 1 0 ]T
where
* dt = 100 ms
* Xt = [Vt at]T
* cove [wt, wT], i = N, E, D : covariance matrix of process noise in i axis
* covi[et, eT], i = N, E, D : covariance matrix of measurement noise in i axis
Scov i[xo, xT], i = N, E, D : covariance matrix of initial states in i axis.
* Xio, i = N, E, D : initial states of each axis i.
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The accelerations given by the Kalman filters are shown in Figure 5-9. Also, acceleration
outputs in body coordinates from the IMU were transformed to NED axes using the CbNED
matrix obtained from roll, pitch and yaw indicator from the IMU. The acceleration outputs
from the IMU resolved in NED axes is shown in Figure 5-10. The attitude angles obtained
from the IMU are presented at Figure 5-11. The difference of the two sets of measurements
of vehicle acceleration is presented in Figure 5-12.
The estimated acceleration from GPS velocity measurements contained spikes at several
points in time. These points correspond to the times when the quality of the GPS mea-
surements was poor. The receiver itself generated signals indicating that the measurements
were of low quality. In Figure 5-13, 5-14, and 5-15 we see that there were significant dif-
ferences between the two sets of measurements when the GPS soulutions were poor. These
signals are :
1. Solution status.
The solution status is zero when the GPS provides a good solution. When it is one,
the number of satellites observable is not adequate. Higher number of solution status
indicates worse quality of the GPS solution, for example, solution status of 4 means
that the trace of the error covariance matrix exceeds 1000 meters.
2. HDOP.
HDOP, horizontal dilution of precision, indicates the error variance in the horizontal
plane.
3. VDOP
VDOP, vertical dilution of precision, indicates the error variance in the vertical axis.
4. Number of satellites.
GPS requires at least four satellites to provide an accurate solution.
These signals will be essential in providing logic for effective decision functions. The method
will be discussed in the sequel.
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5.2.4 Failure Detection Algorithm Development
Failure detection problems in navigation given in the research works of Labarrere [29],
Nikiforov [36], for instance, used either error model of instruments or dynamic model of
vehicles. These models, expressed in state-space equations, are eventually fit into the failure
detection frameworks presented in the previous chapters. In this experiment, error models
of both the GPS and the IMU were not used.
The failure detection algorithms used in this experiment required a state-space model
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of the observations. The state variables used were the difference between the acceleration
indications obtained from the GPS and the IMU measurement resolved in NED reference
frame as shown in Figure 5-12. The state-space model for the unfailed condition is given as
Xt+1 = t+ wt
Yt = xt + et
Xt = IMU _ GPS
cov[o, x0]
cov [Wt, w[T]
cov[et, et]
= 1
= 1 x 10 - 4
= 0.1050
(5.19)
(5.20)
(5.21)
(5.22)
(5.23)
(5.24)
The Development of GLR/MLR Test. The GLR test in this experiment used the
system model of equations 5.19- 5.24. A recursive approach was used in computing the
failure signature with :
pt+l(k) =
pt+l(k ) =
Pk(k) =
Pk(k) =
1- Ipt(k)
ILt(k) + Kt+1p (k)
0
0
(5.25)
(5.26)
(5.27)
(5.28)
were used to compute
(5.29)fN(k) = Zot(k)Stlet.
t=ti
The decision function was given by
lN(k,(k)) = fk(k) (k)
where i2(k) was calculated recursively by the following equations :
= 
-1 + Lt [Et - 1p 1
Pt '1 (k) [ T(k)Pt 1 pt(k) + 1
= Ptv- - Lt(k)Ptv1_
(5.30)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.33)
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P = 1. (5.34)
Note that St is the innovation variance and Kt is the Kalman gain matrix. The quantity
v is the magnitude of a failure assumed under the H1 hypothesis (v = 0 under the Ho
hypothesis). Thus
!tlt(k) = etlt + t(k)v
-tIt(k) = Etlt + T(k) v
where !tlt and etlt are the quantities obtained from the Kalman filter under the hypothesis
of no failure. The GLR test then seeks the possible time of failure T* by searching over
k, ti < k < ti + N where N is the size of the window of observation, ti is the initial time,
and k is the index that refers to the specific data within the window.
The MLR test for on-line application, as we saw in Section 3.3 and 3.5, relies on the
result of the GLR test. The detection function of the on-line MLR test will only amplify
the decision function of the GLR test under the assumption of Gaussian distributed failure.
Hence, if the GLR test performs well, the MLR will give good performance as well.
The Development of 2-filter MLR Test. The MLR test with two filters required
two Kalman filters : one running forward and the other running backward in time. The
following filters were used :
Forward Kalman filter : t = ti, ... , ti + N
eF = yt - F (5.35)
StF  = pF + 0.3 74 2  (5.36)
F 1 = F p [+S ] e F (5.37)
PF = [I- PFS-F] PF + 1.00 x 10 4  (5.38)
DF+1 = D4 + In -SF - ln(2r) -E SFT  F e (5.39)
with the following innitial conditions
* Po = 1
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* 0 = 0
Backward Kalman filter : t = ti + N,..., ti
E = yt- ~i (5.40)
S B  = PB+0.3742 (5.41)
Xt-1x = t + PR [S] - eB (5.42)
P1  = [I - pBS-B] P B + 1.00 x 10- 4  (5.43)
DYt_ = Vy + In IS-BI - ln(27r) - eBT S -Be B  (5.44)
with the following initial conditions :
SPoB =1
* x = 1
The decision function was given by the following equation :
It(k, P(k)) = V~D + Dy (5.45)
As it was illustrated through numerical example in Section 3.5, the decision function It
should be normalized so that a common threshold for failure detection can be applied
regardless the time of failure. The normalization process is described by the following
equation :
t(k,P (k)) = lt(k, i(k)) + inf lt(k, (k)) (5.46)
ti <t<tf
where ti is the initial data within the buffer and tf is the last data within the buffer of
observation.
The measurements are divided into P segments, each of length N. When the 2-filter
MLR algorithm is applied on-line, there will be a delay of detection of N. After segment-
k, the backward filter is started at time k x N, while the forward filter starts processing
segment-(k + 1). When the forward filter reaches the end of segment-(k + 1) at time
(k + 1) x N, the backward filter reaches the beginning of segment-k at time (k - 1) x N + 1
and the decision function of segment-k is available. Thus, this algorithm exhibits a delay
of one window of observation due to requirement of running the backwards filter.
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In the following sections, this algorithm will be referred as the MLR-2 test.
The Development of RFDI. It was described in Section 4.3.3 that to develop the RFDI,
we need to develop an estimator for an augmented system. A failure state is augmented to
system states. The RFDI algorithm used in the experiment assumed that the system model
was known. Hence, as it was described in Section 4.3.1 and illustrated through numerical
example in Section 4.4 Case 1, there was only one Riccati equation to solve. The system,
described by the state-space model of Equations 5.19 and 5.24, was assumed to be driven
by the noise with unknown model yet bounded in 12 setting. The augmented system is
described by the following state-space description :
Xt+l = Axt + Brt (5.47)
yt = Cxt + Drt (5.48)
zt = Mxt (5.49)
where
* Xt = [dat vt]T is the augmented states, d,, is the differences between the acceleration
indications obtained from the GPS and the IMU measurements resolved in NED axes,
and vt is the failure state.
* rt = [wt et]T is the noise vector, wt is the process noise, and et is the measurement
noise.
* The matrices used in the Equations (5.47) - (5.49) are:
11 10
A = B=
01 00
C = [ D= 0 1
K1
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For estimator design purpose, the following quantities were used :
-y 4
1 0
Po =
0 1
For the dynamic system described by the Equations (5.47) - (5.49), the RFDI is given by :
Ht = Pt - -2MT Mt (5.50)
Kt [BDT + AH 1T] [DDT + CH1cT 1 (5.51)
A = A- KtC (5.52)
B = B- KtD (5.53)
Pt+1 = AH- I T  B+ T  (5.54)
lt+l = At + KtYt (5.55)
The decision function for the RFDI is
It = sign('t) . 't" P 2 tl " t (5.56)
where
sign() = 1 if x 
> 0
-1 if x< 0
The thesis of Mangoubi [31] does not include the sign(It) factor in the decision function
of the RFDI filter. This term is proposed in this thesis for failure detection of the GPS
application. The test results showed that this factor suppressed the transient response
significantly leading to a reduction in false alarms.
5.3 Performance Analysis
We saw in the Section 5.2.2, in the preprocessing stage, that the measurement-difference-
states changed significantly when the quality of the GPS solution was poor. Even though
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the Kalman filters in the preprocessing stage are successful in creating white processes when
the GPS signals have high quality, they do not suppress the large errors that result from
low quality GPS solutions. The measurement quality of the GPS affected the performance
of the failure detection algorithms. The variance of measurement statistics when the GPS
solution was poor was large enough to be considered as failure by each failure detection
filter. From the experiment with the IMU and the GPS measurements, there are two cases
that should be considered here.
Case 1 : Low quality GPS solutions. As we saw in Figures 5-13, 5-14, and 5-15, the
difference between the two sets of measurements deviate significantly from zero when the
GPS receiver has a low quality solution.
We will show the decision function of each algorithm for each axis when the GPS solution
is poor. During a period when the GPS signals have poor quality, the failure detection
algorithms do not respond very well to the injected failures. The decision function of each
algorithm increases rapidly when the GPS signal quality degrades.
Consider the time interval that includes t = 3.73 x 104 s. At t = 3.73 x 104 s, the
solution status is 4, which means that the trace of the error covariance matrix exceeds
1000 meters. The differences between the measurements obtained from the GPS and the
IMU measurements especially in N and E axes differed significantly from zero within this
interval. Suppose that both jump failure and ramp failure were injected at t = 3.60 x 104
s. The ramp injected failure had the slope of 0.001 m.s - 3 , which means that for every 0.1
s the failure increases 0.01 m.s - 2 , the magnitude of jump failure was 0.3 m.s - 2 . For the
observation buffer with a length of 10 s, the decision functions in NED axes are shown in
Figures 5-13, 5-14, and 5-15.
The decision function of each algorithm for North axis is shown in Figure 5-13. Each
algorithm did not respond to the injected failures at t = 3.60 x 104 s. The decision function
of each algorithm, however, increased rapidly after t = 3.73 x 104 s. The decision function
of each algorithm for both types of failures was the same. The measurement differences
during this interval hindered the real failures. The injected failures were undetected.
The failure detection process on the East axis also failed. Each algorithm showed that
the failures occured at t = 3.73 x 104 s. The GLR/MLR test and the MLR-2 test decision
functions increased at t = 3.60 x 104 s, the time when failures were injected, but they are
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less dominant compared to the decision functions of the rapid dynamics due to the poor
GPS solutions.
On the vertical axis, the GLR/MLR test and the MLR-2 test showed through their
decision functions that there were failures at t = 3.60 x 104 s. As in the case of the East
axis, the decision functions increased significantly at t = 3.73 x 104 s. Thus, rapid changes
were interpreted as failures by the failure detection algorithms.
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Figure 5-16: The false decision functions on North axis
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Figure 5-17: The false decision functions on East axis
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The statistics of the measurements before and after the jump also describes why the
failures were undetected. Histograms of the measurements on each axis are given in Fig-
ures 5-19, 5-20, and 5-21. The solid lines indicate the sample density of the measurement
before failure, while the dash-dotted lines refer to the sample density after the ump fail-
ure. Except for measurements on the vertical axis, the sample distribution densities of
normal(Ho) and failed(Hi) hypotheses were not well separated. These quasi overlapped
distributions correspond to the equality of probability of detection and the probability of
false alarm.
Performance Analysis Tool : Receiver Operating Characteristic. In signal de-
tection theory, there is an important tool called ROC - receiver operating characteristic
that illustrates the trade-off between the probability of detection and the probability of
false alarm for a receiver. This tool will be used to analyze the performance of the failure
detection algorithms.
In Figures 5-19, 5-20, and 5-21, there are two sample distribution densities : p(ylHo)
and p(ylH1). For each axis, the probability of of detection, PD, and the probability of false
alarm, PFA, are calculated based on the following equations :
PD f p(dalH)d(da) (5.57)
PDO
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PFA = p(daHo)d(da) (5.58)
where 71 is the threshold that divides the decision function into two mutually exclusive
decisions : Ho and H 1 . For a particular 7r, there are associated PD and PFA. The ROC is
constructed by plotting the PD and PFA as we vary the threshold 4.
The ROC has the following properties [46] :
* all continuous LLR have ROC's that are concave downward
* all continuous LLR have ROC's that are above the PD = PEFA line
* the slope of a curve in a ROC at a particular point is equal to the value of the threshold
77 required to achieve the PD and pFA of that point.
There are three significant points in the ROC :
1. (PD = O,PFA = 0), that corresponds to T/ = oo,
2. (PD =1,PFA = 0),
3. (PD = 1 ,PFA = 1), that corresponds to q = 0.
The ideal location in the ROC is the (PD = 1 ,PFA = 0) point which means that the selected
threshold will give no false alarm but failure detection only. If it is not possible to operate
the system in this ideal point, we need to choose the threshold so that the operating point
in the ROC is as close as possible to the ideal point. Thus, we will have the system with
maximum probability of detection and minimum probability of false alarm.
We are now ready to analyze the statistics of the measurement with ROC. The ROC's
of the measurements on NED axes, shown in Figure 5-22, have the following properties :
* as we increase jump magnitude from 0.3 m.s-2 to 0.7 m.s - 2 , the points of each ROC
approach the (PD = 1 ,PFA = 0).
* When the jump magnitude is 0.3 m.s- 2 , the ROC's of the measurements on N and
E axes almost lie on the line PD = PFA, which means that we will always have the
probability of detection equal to the probability of false alarm regardlesss of the choice
of 7. Thus, it is difficult to detect the failure with the magnitude 0.3 m.s-2
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* The ROC on the D axis, in the contrary, shows that it is possible to detect the jump
failure with the magnitude 0.3 m.s - 2 . On this axis, it is possible to detect the failure
with PD > 0.9, PFA < 0.05.
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Figure 5-22: The ROC's of the observations in NED axes
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Case 2: High quality of the GPS solutions. In this section, we will present the
performance of the failure algorithms when the quality of the GPS signal is good. It will
be shown that the failure detection algorithms can identify the presence of failures even if
the jump failure magnitude is small and the ramp failure slope has a small gradient.
Consider the measurement interval that includes the point t = 3.00 x 104 s. Suppose
that we run the failure algorithms from time t = 2.85 x 104 s to t = 3.15 x 104 with
buffer length of 100. Hence we have 300 data points and divide those measurements into 3
segments, each having a length of 100. Two types of failures, jump failure and ramp failure
were injected at t = 3.00 x 104 s. The jump failure has a magnitude 0.3 m.s - 2, while the
ramp failure has a slope 0.001 m.s - 3 . The failure detection algorithm performances are
shown in Figures 5-23, 5-24, and 5-25.
We see in each of Figures 5-23, 5-24, and 5-25 that the algorithms detect the presence
of failures. Each algorithm even gives significant alarm when the ramp failure occurs.
In Figure 5-23, all the algorithms detect the jump failure at about the same time, at
t = 3.00 x 104 s. The decision function of the MLR-2 increases in the beginning and in
the end of the detection process, but it provides a smooth transition from one window of
observation to the next (The transitions occur at t = 2.95 x 104 s and at t = 3.05 x 104 s).
The effect of transient response in the RFDI decision function is forced to go below zero due
to the sign(') factor and its magnitude is diminished due to the P221 factor. The decision
function of RFDI in detecting the ramp failure, however, does not respond as fast as those
of the GLR/MLR test and the MLR-2 test.
In Figure 5-24, each algorithm detects the jump failure on East axis at t = 3.00 x 104
s. The ramp failure can also be detected by the algorithms. The RFDI decision function,
however, exhibits delay in detecting ramp failure.
In Figure 5-25, we see the same detection time of each algorithm. The RFDI decision
function stays at a certain constant value after the detection, while the other algorihtms; the
GLR/MLR and the MLR-2 decision functions, return to zero after detection. The Kalman
filters in these two statistical detection algorithms adjust themselves so that the estimated
outputs follow the measurements.
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5.4 Performance Improvement of Failure Detection Algo-
rithms
From the previous discussions in Section 5.3, we can see that the failure detection algorithms
perform good detection during the time when the GPS receiver give high quality solution.
We also saw that the failure detection algorithms fail to distinguish between the failure and
the measurement dynamics when the GPS solution quality is poor. If we remove parts of
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the measurement differences that correpond to the low quality GPS solution, we will obtain
a new set of measurements from the high quality GPS solution. The ROC's of the new set
of measurements on the NED axes are shown in Figure 5-26. We see in this figure that the
ROC's on the N and E axes do not lie on the line PD = PFA any more. The ROC in D axis
even almost collides with the PD = 1,PFA = 0 point.
These facts suggest that we need to incorporate the solution status signals into the
failure detection process. Hence, it is expected that the failure detection process only works
on the part of the measurements in which the GPS gives a high quality solution.
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Figure 5-26: The ROC of the observations on NED axes after the fragments of the low
quality measurements were removed
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To reach this objective, we propose the following improvement methods.
Adaptive Kalman filter in preprocessing stage We saw in Section 5.3 that the failure
detection algorithms failed to distinguish between failures and measurement dynamics when
the GPS solutions were poor. Each of the failure detection algorithms estimate the presence
of failures by analyzing the measurement differences from the IMU and the GPS. We actually
compared the accelerations from the IMU and the estimated accelerations from the GPS
measurement. The acceleration estimates were generated by the Kalman filter.
The Kalman filters in the preprocessing stage tried to follow the dynamics of measure-
ment outputs even when the solution was not reliable. It is necessary then to inform the
Kalman filter not to track the output of the measurement when the solution is poor. This
information of GPS status will then be used to adjust the Kalman filter gain so that it
will provide estimates based on the previous states only, not based on the measurement
dynamics. It is expected that this approach will reduce the number of spikes.
The two sets of gain are given to the Kalman filter for this compensation purpose. The
first gain is the standard gain, obtained from the Equation (3.12), while the second gain is
Kt = 0 (5.59)
which means that the Kalman filter will estimate the next states based on the previous
state. The second gain is used whenever the solution-status signal exceeds zero. The effect
of this compensation is given in Figures 5-27- 5-28 that show the norm of the measurement-
difference state when the Kalman filters were not compensated and when the Kalman filter
with two sets of gains were used. Using the compensated version of the Kalman filters, we
could expect to obtain the difference-states with smaller variances. The peak corresponds
to the H, norm and the energy correspond of the H 2 norm of the signals.
Logic operator Another way to reduce a false alarm is by ignoring the alarm that cor-
responds to the poor GPS solution. Here, we use the logical operator AND - A. In
this improvement method, we simply use the output of the decision function without any
compensation and compare it to the output of the solution-status signal :
D (k) = lN(k) A solution-status(k) (5.60)
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where Vy(k) is the decision function of window k, isolution-status(k) is the GPS-solution-
status signal. If the observation at window k contains the poor solution, then the output is
simply zero, indicating the difference is due to the poor GPS solution.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 U
NorEad Up-o
Figure 5-27: The comparison of the H2 norm of the difference of measurement on NED axes
North East Up-Domn
Figure 5-28: The comparison of the Hoo norm of the difference of measurement on NED
axes
Adaptive Gain in failure detection algorithms Before proceeding to the main discus-
sion regarding failure detection algorithm compensation, we present the following theorems
from the linear system theory.
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Definition : The Controllable Subspace. The controllable subspace of the linear time-
invariant system
xt+l = Axt + But (5.61)
is the linear subspace of the states that can be reached from the zero state within a finite
time.
Theorem: The controllable subspace of the n-dimensional linear time-invariant system is
the linear subspace spanned by the columns of the controllability matrix:
P=[B AB ... An-1B] (5.62)
In the GLR/MLR test, the Kalman filter has dimension one. Both the forward Kalman
filter and the backward Kalman filter in the MLR-2 test also have dimension one. One
dimensional Kalman filter has the following equation:
=t+l  (A - K - C)it + Kyt (5.63)
If we use K = 1, the it+, is forced to be yt, the next state is forced to follow the current
measurement.
In the RFDI, the augmented system has dimension two. The robust estimator in RFDI
has the following equation:
dat+ = (A- K C) da + Kyt (5.64)
Vt+1 Vt
If we want the state estimate not to grow in the failure state direction, we need to assign
certain numbers to K so that the controllability matrix P has the eigenvectors:
P = K (A-K-C) K] (5.65)
1 0
el = , e2 = (5.66)
0 0
The choice of K = [1 O T satisfies Equation (5.65) - (5.66)
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A poor solution of GPS makes the difference significantly greater than zero. To alert
the failure detection filters the presence of the poor solution, we could use the following
approach:when the GPS solution status increases, use different set of gains for the calcu-
lation within the window of observation. The following gain can be used for this particular
problem:
* GLR/MLR failure detection filter :
Kt =1 (5.67)
* RFDI failure detection filter :
Kt = (5.68)
0
* MLR-2 failure detection filter :
K = 1 (5.69)
KB  = 1 , (5.70)
where the superscripts F and B refer to forward filter and backwards filter.
Those gains will force the filter to follow the measurement and give zero residuals even
with the existence of poor solution signals. For the RFDI filter, the gain is selected so that
the estimation lies in the direction of
da1
v 0
which is the direction of the measurement-difference state. This direction will prevent
growth in the failure estimation. This principle is adopted from the controllability property
in linear system theory.
The performance of each filter after this compensation is shown in Figures 5-29, 5-30,
and 5-31. These figures should be compared to the Figures 5-16, 5-17, and 5-18 since both
sets show the detection function at the same time interval.
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Figure 5-29: The compensated decision functions on North axis
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Figure 5-30: The compensated decision functions on East axis
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Figure 5-31: The compensated decision functions on Down/vertical axis
The detection functions died off after the new set of gains was used. The decision
functions of the RFDI filter immediately went to zero. The same thing also occured with
the MLR-2 filter. The increases at both ends are due to the inital and final processings. This
would not be a problem if the filter was run continuously. The decision of the GLR/MLR
tests however still increased before the poor solution status appeared. This shows that the
algorithm is still sensitive to the high dynamic of the measurement.
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The GLR/MLR test did not work very well due to the following reason:
rt = Yt - C:t
= yt - Cyt- 1
= Yt- Yt-1 (5.71)
The Equation (5.71) shows the difference equation of the measurement variable yt. As differ-
entiation process in continuous function, taking the difference in the discrete-time function
will amplify the noise. Hence, the residual is sensitive to the measurement dynamics. The
residual may exceed a certain bound due to rapid dynamics so that the GLR/MLR test will
interpret this as a failure.
5.5 Computational Complexity
The complexity of each algorithm is shown in Figure 5-32. The GLR/MLR test indeed
requires computation on the order of O(n 2), where n indicates the length of the buffer of
observation. The MLR-2 and the RFDI require a much smaller number of operations, with
the MLR-2 algorithm requiring the least computation.
GL/MLR - 8467827 flops
RFDI 130414 fops MLR-2 93282 flops
2 3
aoim
Figure 5-32: The computational complexity of failure detection algorithms
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5.6 Closing Remarks
We saw in the beginning of Section 5.4 that without the measurements of the the poor GPS
solution, the ROC's of measurements on NED axes were concave downward. It means that
if we select the correct rl such that the corresponding point on ROC is close to the point
(PD = 1 ,PFA = 0), the failure detection will give good performance. The algorithm decision
functions will have high probability of detection and low probability of false alarm.
The proposed compensation makes the algorithms only work on the measurements when
the GPS receiver provides high quality solution. Thus, the nice property of ROC's shown
in Figure 5-26 is expected to be achievable.
The RFDI or the MLR-2 have the least computational complexity, but the GLR/MLR
test and the RFDI give the fastest detection. The MLR-2 decision function of at time k -N
is given at time (k + 1) -N. The time of detection of the GLR/MLR test within the buffer,
however, is faster than that of the RFDI. This fact will not be a problem as long as the
final decision is given at the end of observation, after N observations are made.
The compensation with two sets of gains reduces the number of false alarms. We need
to be careful, however, since prior to the poor solution signal, the GLR/MLR test's decision
function can already rise to a significant value. Other signals might need to be used instead
of the solution status signal, such as the velocity status signal for compensation.
131
132
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Before proceeding to the conclusion, we will summarize the discussion of each chapter. The
conclusion of this thesis is presented after the summary section and the suggestions will
close this chapter.
6.1 Thesis Summary
Chapter 2 should provide an adequate background of the hypothesis testing for failure
detection. The hypothesis testing described in Chapter 2 was developed for the system
with either hardware redundancy or analytical redundancy. The performance measures
used in Chapter 6, i.e., the probability of false alarm, the probability of detection, and
computational complexity were given in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 gave the description of failure detection algorithms from the statistical point
of view. The framework of failure detection is developed based on probability theory. The
GLR test, for instance, develops the decision function by maximizing the LLR of the obser-
vation by varying both possible failure location and possible failure magnitude. The MLR
name implies the marginalization of the nuisance parameter, so that the maximalization
is developed only on a single parameter. The MLR test tries to find the possible time of
failure that will maximize the LLR of the observation. Marginalization of the related obser-
vation densities makes it possible to derive the failure detection algorithm implemented by
only two filters. The MLR test implemented by only two filters was described. Numerical
examples were given to illustrate how the algorithm worked to detect the failure.
Chapter 4 gave a description of the failure detection algorithm based on the deterministic
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framework. The general idea of this deterministic approach is to build a robust observer
that will estimate the failure state. The robust estimator is developed on the game-theoretic
optimization where the noise and plant perturbation are one player, and the state estimate
is their opponent. There are two kinds of estimators derived, the first one corresponds
to the estimator for systems with unknown noise model, the second one correspond to the
estimator for systems whose dynamic model and noise model are not known accurately. The
RFDI is basically the estimator whose state vector is the augmentation of state dynamics
and failure dynamics. The RFDI eventually acts as the observer that will estimate the
failure state. Numerical examples were given to illustrate how to use each type of estimator
for failure detection purposes.
Chapter 5 illustrated the application of the algorithms given in the previous chapters in
a real situation. The problem faced by each of the algorithms encouraged the improvements
proposed in Section 5.3. The proposed improvements are expected to reduce the number of
false alarms due to the low quality of observation.
6.2 Conclusion
The deterministic failure detection algorithm : the RFDI and the statistical failure detection
algorithms : the GLR/MLR test and the MLR-2 test were studied and applied on the real
data observation. The results lead to the following conclusion :
1. The deterministic and the statistical failure detection algorithms function well under
the condition that the observation behaves as it is predicted from the model. When
the observation dynamic is beyond the operating region of the model, the false alarm
probability will increase significantly.
2. The compensation by adaptive filter gain allows the reduction of false alarm rate. The
deterministic filter as well as the MLR-2 filter respond very well with the adaptive
gain approach.
3. The detection time of the deterministic algorithm is not as fast as that of the statistical
algorithm : the GLR/MLR test. The estimation process of the failure magnitude in
the deterministic setting is not instantaneous since the deterministic filter should
distinguish whether it is really a failure state or it is just a transient response.
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4. Introducing the additional factor in the decision function of the deterministic algo-
rithm, sign(v) turns out to be useful. It will suppress the squared transient response
below zero. The actual failure magnitude is greater than zero and the squared failure
magnitude is distinguishable from the squared transient response. The use of inverse
variance of failure states will heavily penalize the high transient response of the failure
estimate.
5. The deterministic algorithm and the MLR-2 are computationally efficient. The GLR/MLR
test requires parallel Kalman filters for on-line application, hence will require more
computing power and memory space. The deterministic algorithm and the MLR-2
test require less computing power and memory space.
6.3 Recommendation for Future Work
Refinement should be made before the algorithms are applied to real applications.
1. Modeling
A better model should be used rather than just one single dimension of measurement
difference. The capability of this model is very limited, since the deviation of the
nominal value will easily be judged as failure by the failure detection algorithms.
Knowing the error model of each instrument will give a better performance, since the
filters will have more knowledge of the real system. The filter then will know whether
the real failure occurs or it is just the dynamic of the observation.
2. Real-time In-flight Experiment
Flying the instruments of experiment off-the-ground will reduce the number of obstacle
between the GPS satellites and the GPS receiver antenna, hence it is expected that
the frequency of bad solution status will decrease. It will be interesting to see the
performance of the compensated failure detection algorithms in the real flight and in
real-time.
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Appendix A
Constructing The Parity Matrix
Consider the hardware redundancy system with the following measurement equation
Yt = HtXt + Vt + T(t, to) (A.1)
Yt represents the observation vector, Xt represents the quantities measured, Vt represents
the noise of measurement and T(t, to) represents the additive failure vector. The parity
vector is given by
Ct = ctvt + CtT(t, to) (A.2)
The expected value and the covariance of the parity vector will be
E[Ct] = CtTt, to
cov[(t] = CtRtCtT
(A.3)
(A.4)
Consider the least squares
noise covariance Rt
estimate of the state vector Xt, given the measurement Yt, with
t = (H Rlt 'H 1 H Yt
= Xt + (HR-1 Ht) 1 H R (Y + T(t, to))
(A.5)
The residual vector resulting from this estimate of Xt is
et = Y- HtXt
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= [Inxn - Ht(HTRt 1Ht)-1HT R1] Yt
= [Inxn - Ht(HT Rt1Ht)-1HT Dt DtDt Yt
SDt [Inxn - D1 Ht(HTRt Ht)-1HTDtT] Dt-Yt
= DtCTCt Dt lyt
The last relationship provides the equality for C matrix.
cTC ct = Inxn - D 1 Ht(H R 1Ht) HTDt
(A.6)
(A.7)
(A.8)Rt = DtD T
In the case where Rt = I, the following algorithm can be used to determine Ct, or C for
time-invariant case.
Let
W = CTC = I - H(HTH)-HT
The elements of the C matrix are
C11 = (W11)
Wl1
Clj -
Vll
j =2,.
cij = 0,
Wi ii- E viiv 13
Vii
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(A.9)
(A.10)
(A.11)
(A.12)
Cii = Wii (A.13)
(A.14)
1
i-1 22
l=1
j = i + 1,..
where
H E )nxr
I E Rnxn
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Appendix B
Statistical Failure Detection
Algorithm Notes
B.1 The Density of Measurement
Suppose we have observation yN = {Yi, Y2,... , XN}. From Bayes' rule we have
p(A, B) = p(AIB)p(B) (B.1)
Following the Bayes' rule, the density function of the measurements is expressed as
p(yN) = p(y1,y2,... ,N)
= (YNIY l,Y2,...,YN-1)P (Y1,2,... YN-1)
= P (yN IyN ) , (yN1)
N
= Ip (ytlyt-) (B.2)
t=1
N
= 7 (yt - Htitjl-1, HtPt- 1HT + Rt)t=1
B.2 The Backwards Markovian Model
Given a wide sense forwards Markovian model, namely a state-space system driven by a
white-noise process. The white-noise process is uncorrelated with the random inital state of
the system. For this forward model, we can obtain a corresponding backwards Markovian
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model,i.e. a system driven backwards in time from the terminal state by a white-noise
process that is uncorrelated with this terminal state.
For the forwards Markovian model on the interval [0, T],
Xt+1 = Ftxt + Gtut
Yt = Htxt + Jtut
E[ut]
E[utu,]
E[xo]
E[xtz,]
E[xout]
= 0
(B.3)
= 0
= I0,
= 01 t>0
the backwards Markovian model of the same interval [0, T] will be
oX 1 = Fex? + Guo
B 1 = H + JU B
Yt-= t UT
E[XuBB] = 0, t<T
(B.4)
In the case of invertible Ft, the backward matrices will be
Ftl -1 F -= -1-FIGtGT IIT1
Gt = -Fi-Gt
He 1 = Ht Ft + Jtt t+1
+ 1 = Ht Gt 1+J J' +1 =HG +g
(B.5)
More information related to backwards Markovian model can be found in [47].
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B.3 Derivation of Linear Regression Through State-Space
Approach
Consider the linear regression model :
T + eY t =VT(Pt +t
and assuming that the true value of parameter vector 0 varies according to
't+1 = vt + Wt
We then have the following state-space description of the system :
t+1 = vt + w t
= T etYt =(t vt + et
Given the following description of noise :
E[wtw T ]
E[eteT]
E[wtv T ] = 0
The Kalman filter equations to estimate 0 are :
i:t+llt+l = fjtt + Gt+l[yt+l - T+t t]
Gt= Pt,t-lcpt[pPt,t-l pt + Re]-
Pt,t- 1
Pt,t
- Pt-1,t-1
= (I - Gtc t)Pt-1,t-1
Pt-1,t-1 - Pt-1,t-1 t[ Pt-t-1 t -+ t Pt-lt-1
with :
* Gt : Kalman filter gain
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(B.6)
(B.7)
(B.8)
(B.9)
(B.10)
(B.11)
= ReSt-r
= Re6t__r
* Pt : covariance matrix of 0
SRt = 0
B.4 On-Line Expressions for The GLR Test
From the Kalman filter equations under the hypotheses of no jump, we have the following
variables:
Jtlt, Kt = Ptt_1HtSt 1, Et = Yt - Ht,tlt, St = Rt + HtPtlt=1 HtT
Suppose there was jump v at time k, we could postulate the following model,
etlt(k) = etlt + pT (k)v (B.12)
Here ,itlt and etlt are quantities obtained from the Kalman filter under the hypotheses of no
jump. The relationships hold due to the linearity properties of the model.
The regressor pt(k) and soT(k) are computed recursively by
't+l (k))
pt+1(k)
= Ht+l( Fi - Ftpt(k))
i=k
= Ftpt(k) + Kt+lcpT(k) (B.13)
with the initial conditions
Pk (k)
sPT (k) = 0 (B.14)
The recursive expressions of pt and pt are derived as follows.
soT(k)v = et+1(k) - et+
= Ht+l[xt+ (k) - ,it+1(k)] - Ht+1[xt+1 - :~t+l]
- Ht+l[xt+l(k) - xt+1] - Ht+l[3t+l(k) - it+l]
t
= Ht+l(II Fi)v - Ht+lFt[it(k) 
- 3tit]
i=k
144
and
plt+1(k)v
= Ht+l[ Fi - Ftpt(k)]
i=k
= t+llt+l (k) - tllt+l 1
=- t+llt(k) + Kt+lEt+l (k) - :t+llt - Kt+let+l
= Fttlt(k) + Kt+,et+l + Kt+lOt+l ( k ) v - F.itlt - Kt+lEt+l
- Ft[itlt(k) - itt] + Kt+lOt+1 ( k)v
= Ftpt(k)v + Kt+,T+l 1 (k)v
The likelihood ratio test is expressed as :
yN(k, i(k))
(B.15)
(B.16)
p(e k, (k))
= 210ogp k = N)
p(eflk = N)
- ETStlte - (Et - OT(k) i(k))T S 1 (Et - (PT(k) (k))
t=k+l
= fT(k)RN1fN(k) (B.17)
The quantities fN(k) and RN(k) are the quantities of the LS estimator. They are computed
recursively in the following manner.
fN (k)
RN(k)
= : Pt (k) S; et
t=1
N
= t(k)SiT(k) (B.18)
The maximum likelihood estimate of v, given the jump instant at k is
=(k)  RNl fN (k) (B.19)
For on-line application, we need to modify equation for I to avoid matrix inversion compu-
tation of R. Instead, i is computed through recursive equations :
t t-1 + Lt[t - pT^t
Lt =Ptt[ t + At]
Ut- rt -l t Jr At]-1
(B.20)
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Pt" = P-1 - Ltt Pt-
as it was given in Appendix B.3.
B.5 The MLR Test Derivation
Consider the following hypotheses :
Ho  et E N(O, St) (B.21)
H1  t E N(GpTvl, St). (B.22)
Let
* Yt = Et;
" Y={Yl,Y2,...,YN};
S' = {f1,2--, N... -
where p is the system dimension, N is the observation length, and d is the dimension of v.
In the MLR test, v is considered as a random variable. This is the key for marginalization.
Marginalizing the conditional probability of p(yNIv) will give
p(yN) = J p(yN Iv)p(v)dv
)exp [(Y - )Tv)T A-1(Y - 4v) + (v - vo)T Ro ( - vo) d
(B.23)
The expression inside the exponent can be rewritten as
(y_ Tv)T A (YT v) +(v vo) Ro(v-vo)
yT A-ly - 2 T 4 A-1Y + vT A-' Tv + T Rov - vo Rovo
= T (Ro + RN) v - 2 T (fo + fN) + yT A-y + vTRovo
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(v - (Ro + RN)-'(fo + fN))T (Ro + RN) (v- (Ro + RN)-(fo + N)) -
(fo + fN)T(Ro + RN)-(fo + fN) + yTA-1y + VTRovo
(V - )T (Ro + RN) (v- - ) - jT(fo + fN) + yTA-ly + vojRovo
S(v )T (Ro+R )(v-) (Y + j ) A 1(Y - 4T)+
,TfN -_ iTRNi - iTfo + vTRovo
(v )T (R+ RN) ( - )+ (Y - Ti) - A _ 1 4T) +
0T(fo + fN) - 2ifo - iT(Ro + RN)' + 'TRo0i + vOTRovo
(v-0)(Ro+ RN) (V-)+ Y-- f 9)
+ ( - vo)T Ro (' - vo)
The following relationships are used for expanding the exponential.
RN = 4A-1 T
fN = OA - Y
fo = Rovo
, = (Ro+RN)-(fo + fN)
For ) E N(v, Ro + RN) the probability p(yN) can be written as
p(y) = (27r)-Np/2  AI -N/
2 X IRo + RN /2
1
x exp{-[(Y - T IN)TA-l(Y - 4Tj'N) + (jf - v0 )TR 0 (DT - v0)]}
x j (2 7r) - d/2 x IRo + RN 1/ 2
1
x exp[--(v - N)T(Ro + RN)(V - yN)] dv2
= p(yNI) x( Ro +RN /2
1
x exp[- (v - N)(Ro + RN)(V - i/N)]2
p(yNI p) X Pv(fX pN1/2 x (27r)d/2 (B.24)
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For p,(v) = 1, the case of non-informative prior, Ro is set to zero since this prior has infinite
variance. By doing so, the probabilty p(yN) can be written as
p(yN) = p(yN N) x (2 7r)
- d/2 x
f exp[--(v - N)T(Ro + RN)(v -- N)] dv
- p(yNli ) X PN 1/2 (B.25)
Now, the LLR for Gaussian prior is given by
p(yNI*) p(yT*)p(yN+lyk*)
2In IT* 21n I -r*)
p(y) p(y N1*)p(y+ y*)
p(yN+lykT*)
- 21n
p(yN+l yT*)
2 1np(yN iN) x p,() x IPN 1/ 2 x (2 7r)d/2
p(y5+lyr*)
N
= 1 c _-'t+- (_  _T(r*)'N("*))T S -1 x
t=7*+1
(Ct - ( (T*)1)N(T*))+ log IPN(T*)I - log IPv( *)I +
(i(T*) - uo)TP-l((T*) - vo)
- lN(T*, i(T*)) - log IRN(T*)I + Cprior (B.26)
where d is the dimension of v. The LLR for non-informative prior is derived in the same
manner as that of equation (B.26).
2 pn(YNI" r *) 21np(y*)p(yN+I yk,T*)
p(yN) (y*)p(yN+ |y*)
p 2n(yN+lykT*)
2* n
= 2 1np(yNIPN) x IPN 1 / 2
p(yN+, y'-*)
N
E T*+1 t (-- --t _ (T *)pN(T))Tsrl X
t=7-*+
(Et - OT (T*)PN(T*)) + log IPN(T*) + 0
= lN(T*, (7T*)) - In IRN(T*) + Cprior. (B.27)
where p is the dimension of Et.
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Appendix C
Derivations of Deterministic
Failure Detection Algorithm
C.1 Derivation of Robust Estimator for The Uncertain Noise
Model
The derivation of the robust estimator in the case of unknown noise model will be given in
this section. The state-space equations from equations (4.5) - (4.7) are repeated here.
xt+l = Atxt + Btrt
et = M(Xt -t)
Yt= Ctxt + Dtrt
(C.1)
(C.2)
(C.3)
For the performace index
J = le112
S2 (xt - it)tMtTMt(xt - it)
t=1
(C.4)
the game theoritic approach is used to derive the estimator. The optimization of the per-
formace index that leads to the derivation of the estimator is expressed as
mmin max J1Sr,xo (C.5)
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with the constraints of equations (C.1) - (C.3) and
1lr112 + II - 01o 1 (C.6)
The estimator will be in the same form as the Kalman filter :
Xt+1 = (At - KtCt).t + Ktyt (C.7)
it+l = (At - KtCt)it + (Bt - KtDt)rt
= Atit + Btrt
it = Xt - t (C.8)
et = Mtxt
The game theoritic optimization now can be described as :
minmax J (C.9)
K r,xo
subject to t+l = At:it + trt
and |lr112 + Ilxo - -o112 < 1
K = [Ko,...,KN-1]
To incorporate constraints into the performance index, Langrange multipliers are introduced
to the new performance index J2, [45]:
N-1 2
2 J1 + [A+1(t+ 1 - t - B it)]- ( + io - )
t=o
2 (rTro + f '1) + AT(-oio - Boro)
N - 1 + -T 1 2 T +-A T-1
+ [AITt + 2 xt Mt Mit - 2 rt + t+1(-At't - Btrt)]
t=1
1 MNTMNN + ATNN (C.10)
where Ai; i = 0,..., N- 1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the dynamic
constraints and 2! is the Lagrange multiplier of the disturbance constraint.2
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Taking the variation of J2 and setting the variation 6J 2 = 0 will give the extreme values
of the performance index J2.
2J2 22 _2
-J2 = bo + bit + al 6rt + 2 OiO aaitart t~l
J2 N-1(i MM0 - + T)
aJ = (-2 T _ t+1t
it t= t t+t=o
N-1
a (@.+l - tt- Btrt)T
t=0
Setting eJ2 = 0, we will get the following equations :
= -2BfAtl (C.11)
rt = -- 2 Bt t+1
it+l = Att + Btrt (C.12)
S= -- 2p0a TA1  (C.13)
- At = MTMtit- AAt+ (C.14)
where r' and i* are quantities that maximize J2. From equations (C.12)- (C.14), we can
compose the Hamiltonian system based on the states it and At :
t+l At T t (C.15)
-At MTMt 
-At  At+l
The solution of the linear state-space system incorporates the state transition matrix.
At [21(t, 0) 22(t, 0) O (.16)
[ o ][ 1(0, t) D12(0,t) it (.17)
Ao 0 J21R(0,t) 422(0, t) At
With Mo = 0, we can rearrange equation (C.14) and combine the result from equation (C.17)
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to obtain the following equations.
O = o + -,-2PAo
= 11(0, t)it + + 12 (0, t)At + -2po[21(0, t)t + ,22 (o, t)At]
= [D11(0, t) + -- 2PoA21(0, t)]~t + [1 2 (0, t) + 7-2v 22 (0, t)]At
Define
Pt = ["/2 11(0, t) + P0 21(0, t)]-' [ 1 2(0, t) + 7-2PO 0 22(0, t)] (C.18)
then
it = -7-2PtAt (C.19)
Pt is an important variable for determining the gain of the estimator. In what follows, we can
see that Pt can be expressed recursively. Recursive equation is required for real-time applica-
tion. To derive the recursive expression of Pt, we combine the equations (C.14), (C.14), (C.13)
and (C.12).
it = -7-2PtAt
it = --2Pt(M MtTi- T+ 1At+l )
St = - 7 -2(I - -2PtM, MTt)-Pt AT t+
t-+1 = A-t(-7-2( -- 2P M, Mt)- PA T+) + [3(-_Y-2 T t+1)
it+, = -- 2(~(- - t MM-P )T-PA + BP}iA A
Substituting vt+l with that of equation (C.19) expressed at time t + 1 gives
-'-2Pt+lAt+1 = -- 2{At(I y-2ptMTMt)-lptT +BBtT}At+ 1
= -
2 {At (P-1 -2M Mt) - 1 T + T}t+
The Riccati equation (in recursive form) of Pt will be
Pt+l = AtH-AT + BtBT (C.20)
Ht = Pt - 7-2MTMt (C.21)
Po = o (C.22)
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AN : arbitrary (C.23)
t = 0,...,N-1
Both r* and i* are maximizing values, however, the proof of this statement is not included
here. The proof can be obtained from [31]. Define the new performance index
J3 = max J1 (C.24)
r,xo
We need to derive the values of K that will minimize J3 to satisfy equation (C.5) . Taking
the derivative of J3 with respect to K and setting the derivation equal to zero will give K
that maximizes the performance index J3.
1 N-1
J3 = max t+1t 1Mt+l~ t+
t=0
1 N-1
= max E (A. t + Btrt)T M 1Mt+l(Atit + Btrt)
t=0
-4 N-1
2 (AtH +'At M +t+1
S 2- tr[( AtAHi)(g-iAT + BtBT)T Mt+MiT(tr' + BtBT)]+1
=9~ t[L(t+t tHr t
t=O
(AtHi-IAT + iBtT )]
T e-4 d a ieu Ti + erivativ  o( v)aMt+hM
t=0
OKt (tH- A t )
The minimizing K can be obtained by setting
8 J3
- 0. (C.25)
aKt
The derivative in equation (C.25) vanishes for
aa [(At - KtCt)Hr'(At 
- KtCt)T + (Bt - KtDt)(Bt - KtDt)T] = 0. (C.26)
aK
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Solving the equation (C.26) for Kt gives
K* = [BtDT + AtHtlCT][DtDT + CtHt 1C ]- (C.27)
Equation (C.27) provides the minimizing Kt since the Hessian of J3 with respect to Kt is
positive definite under the condition that DtDT + CtHt'C' is positive definite.
C.2 Derivation of Robust Estimator for Uncertain System
and Noise Models
The state-space representation of the nominal model and the estimator from the Chapter
4 is repeated here.
xt+l = Atxt + Btdt (C.28)
Et = Stxt + Ttdt (C.29)
et = Mt(xt - t) (C.30)
Yt = Ctxt + Dtdt (C.31)
where
io = X0 -Xo
dt = [rT rT]T
In Chapter 4, the performance criterion J1 is given in equation (4.33). The constrained
optimization of J1 is solved through game theoritic optimization. This optimization requires
modification of the performance index J1 to the new performance index J2. The game
theoritic optimization problem formulation used to derive the estimator is stated in the
following mathematical expression
min max J2 (C.32)
1 d,xo
subject to equations (C.28)- (C.31) as constraints, with
2 le1 + 1III 2 - y(lld|2 + IIxo - o-1) (C.33)j2 = le (I dlX - C.33
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The weighted 2-norm of x with time-varying weight can be described as follows :
i2II1
IIXt
N-1
= Z: xxtt=O
N-1
= X+1xt+ t+1 + Xozo
t=O
under the consdition that the weight at N is
XN = O.
Zero term can then be expressed as follows
N-11 1 T
o = N(XT lXt+lt+ 1 - zTXtxt) + - Xozo
t=O
(C.34)
We are interested in the second and the third terms of the performance index J2. Expand-
ing those terms and adding with zero term obtained from equation (C.34) will give the
expression for the worst case disturbance dt.
2- 2
11 2 _ 2 |d 2
1 N-1
= { Z{(Stxt + Ttdt)T(Stxt + Ttdt) - 72ddt} +
t=O
N-1
E (xitXt+,Xt+l - zXTXtz ) + ZxoXoXot=O
The difference equation describing the state dynamics is used to substitute the xt+l factor.
We proceed the derivation by expanding the right hand side of the equation C.35 :
1 2 1 N-1
-ldl2 - d2 = {x[STSt + ATXt+IAt - Xt]xt +
t=0
d t + BTt+IBt - 72 t +
1 T
2xT[STTt + ATXt+lBt]dt} + -xXozo
2 N-1
2 i- (-2x [Xt - STSt - ATXt+ 1At]xt +t=0
d[I -_-2 (TT + BTXt+Bt)]d -
2-2f [STT + ATX +lBt]dt} + X0zoo2 (C.36)
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(C.35)
Define
Zt = I- -2[TTT + BTXt+lBt]
Ft = ST + ATXt+IBt
(C.37)
(C.38)
Note that Zt is symmetric. Rewriting the equation (C.36) with factors introduced in equa-
tions (C.37) and (C.38) will give
2 2ll 2 - TIdl2 ,2 N-1
= 2 - Z{dTZtdt - 2-2xFtdt +
t=O
-4 Ft Ztl FTXt } + -oXoxo
2 N-1
-~ {dZT/2 Ztl/2dE - 2y-2XFze-1/2 Zj/2 d +
t=O
-4 TF Z-1/2 ,-1/2 ,Tt OZ 1
7-t Jcz, t zt t Zt + Xoxo2
2 N-1
2 E IIZl/2dt- 7-2Z-1/2FTXt 2 + -oXozo
t=O
(C.39)
There are several things that should be noted here. First, to complete the square inside the
summmation, we introduce the following equality :
FtZ 1-'FT = Xt - ATXt+IAt - StTS t . (C.40)
If we rearrange the terms in equation (C.40), we will have the following Riccati equation :
Xt = ATXt+At + sTSt + FtZt-'F T (C.41)
with the final condition
XN = 0 (C.42)
Second, the terms inside the summation on the right hand side of equation (C.39) will be
defined as
N-1
1dll2 = -  Z1/2It _ r-2 Z1/2FT t 112
t=O
(C.43)
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The last equality will lead us to the following result
dt = Z/ 2 dt - d (C.44)
dt = 7 -2Z-1/ 2 FTx t (C.45)
where dt is the worst possible disturbance.
The estimator for the time-varying system of equation (C.28) will be derived based on
the worst possible disturbance d*. If we substitute dt in the state-space equation with dt
from equation (C.45), the new state-space description will be as follows.
xt+l = Atxt + Bt(Zt-1 2dt + Z/2dt)
= (At + BtZ-1/ 27-2Z-1/ 2FT)xt + BtZtl/2d
Yt = Ctxt + Dt(Z-1/2d + Z-1/2dt)
= (Ct + DtZT1/2  2Z t1/2Fty)xt + DtZ 1/ 2dt
The state-space equations in a new coordinate system are :
Xt+1 = Atxt + Btdt (C.46)
Yt = txt + Dtdt (C.47)
where
At = At + BtZ-1/ 2 -2Z 1/ 2FT  (C.48)
Bt = BtZt1/2  (C.49)
Ot = Ct + DtZt1/2 -2Zt/2 FtT (C.50)
Dt = DtZt- 1/2  (C.51)
To derive the estimator based on the new state-space equations (C.48) - (C.51), a new
performance index J3 is defined as follows to replace the performance index J2.
J3 = Ilell2 _- 2(11112+ IIXo - ollo-1) (C.52)
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The optimization problem then can be expressed as
min maxJ3  (C.53)
Sd, zo
with the constraints of equations (C.48) - (C.51). This problem is equivalent with that
expressed in equation (C.5), (C.1) - (C.3), (C.7). The solution for this optimization is
given by the following equations :
it+l = (At - tt)It + Ktt (C.54)
kt = [Bt.DT + AtHf-OT][Dt T + Ott-' ] (C.55)
Ht = p- - -2MTMt (C.56)
Pt+ = (At- KtCt)Htl (At - KtCt)T +
(Bt - KtDt)(Bt - KtDt)T  (C.57)
Po = P (C.58)
t = 0,...,N-1
158
References
[1] B.D.O. Anderson and J.B. Moore. Optimal Filtering. Prentice-Hall, 1979.
[2] Brent D. Appleby. Robust Estimator Design Using the Hoo and p Synthesis. PhD thesis,
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1990.
[3] Brent D. Appleby and John R. Dowdle. "Robust Estimator Design using p Synthesis".
In Proceedings of The 30th Conference on Decision and Control, Brighton, England,
December 1991. IEEE.
[4] Michele Basseville and Igor V. Nikiforov. Detection of Abrupt Changes, Theory And
Applications. Prentice-Hall, 1993.
[5] Richard V. Beard. Failure Accommodation in Linear Systems Through Self-
Reorganization. PhD thesis, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971.
[6] R.G. Brown and P.Y.C. Hwang. Introduction To Random Signals and Applied Kalman
Filtering. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1992.
[7] Edward Y. Chow and Alan S. Willsky. "Analytical Redundancy and the Design of Ro-
bust Failure Detection Systems". IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control, 29(7):603-
614, 1984.
[8] C.K. Chui and G. Chen. Kalman Filterring With Real-Time Applications. Springer-
Verlag, 1991.
159
[9] Clark E. Cohen. Attitude Determination Using GPS: Development of An All Solid-
State Guidance, Navigation, and Control Sensor for Air and Space Vehicles Based On
The Global Positioning Systems. PhD thesis, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 1992.
[10] Munther A. Dahleh and G.C. Verghese. "Dynamic Systems". 6.241 Lecture Notes, Fall
1996.
[11] Kevin C. Daly, Eliezer Gai, and James V. Harrison. "Generalized Likelihood Test for
FDI in Redundant Sensor Configuration'. Journal of Guidance and Control, 2(1):9-17,
January-February 1979.
[12] James C. Deckert, Mukund N. Desai, John J. Deyst, and Alan S. Willsky. "F-8 DFBW
Sensor Failure Identification Using Analytic Redundancy". IEEE Transaction on Au-
tomatic Control, 1977.
[13] Mukund N. Desai, James C. Deckert, and John J. Deyst. "Dual-Sensor Failure Iden-
tification Using Analytical Redundancy". Journal of Guidance and Control, pages
213-220, May-June 1979.
[14] J.J. Deyst. "Real-Time Systems for Aerospace Vehicles". 16.840 Lecture Notes, Spring
1996.
[15] John J. Deyst, James V. Harrison, Eliezer Gai, and Kevin C. Daly. "Fault Detection,
Identification, and Reconfiguration for Spacecraft Systems". Journal of the Astronau-
tical Sciences, 1981.
[16] Bradford W. Parkinson et.al., editor. Global Positioning System: Theory and Applica-
tions. AIAA, INC, 1996.
[17] Paul M. Frank. "Fault Diagnosis in Dynamic Systems Using Analytical and Knowldege-
based Redundancy - A Survey and Some New Results". Automatica, 1990.
[18] et.al. Garry J. Ballas. p-Analysis and Synthesis Toolbox User's Guide. MathWorks,
INC, 1995.
[19] Arthur Gelb, editor. Applied Optimal Estimation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1974.
[20] Frederik Gustafsson. "A Two-Filter Off-Line Solution To Optimal Detection". Tech-
nical report, Link6ping University, Sweden, 1991.
160
[21] Frederik Gustafsson. Estimation of Discrete Parameters in Linear Systems. PhD thesis,
Linkoping University, Sweden, 1992.
[22] Frederik Gustafsson. "The Marginalized Likelihood Ratio Test for Detecting Abrupt
Changes". IEEE Transactions On Automatic Control, 41(1), January 1996.
[23] Frederik Gustafsson and Hakan Hjalmarsson. "Twenty-one ML Estimators for Model
Selection". Automatica, 31(10):1377-1392, 1995.
[24] Steven R. Hall. Parity vector compensation for FDI. Master's thesis, Department of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1981.
[25] Steven R. Hall. A Failure Detection Algorithm for Linear Dynamic System. PhD thesis,
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1985.
[26] Harold L. Jones. Failure detection in linear systems. PhD thesis, Department of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973.
[27] Richard Kornfeld. Research in progress : Attitude determination with GPS-IMU. PhD
thesis, -in progress, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, 1997.
[28] Huibert Kwakernaak and R. Sivan. Linear Optimal Control Systems. John Wiley,
1972.
[29] M. Labarrere. "Aircraft Sensor Failure : Detection by Analytic Redundancy". In M.G.
Singh, editor, Systems and Control Encyclopedia, volume 1, pages 246-251. Pergamon
Press, Oxford, 1987.
[30] Frank L. Lewis and Vassilis L. Syrmos. Optimal Control. John Wiley & Sons, INC,
1995.
[31] Rami S. Mangoubi. Robust Estimation and Failure Detection for Linear Systems.
PhD thesis, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1995.
161
[32] Rami S. Mangoubi, Brent D. Appleby, and Jay Farrell. "Robust Estimation in Fault
Detection". In Proceedings of The 31st Conference on Decision and Control, pages
2317-2322, Tucson, Arizona, December 1992. IEEE.
[33] Rami S. Mangoubi, Brent D. Appleby, and G.C. Verghese. "Robust Estimation for
Discrete-Time Linear Systems". In Proceedings of The American Control Conference,
pages 656-661, Baltimore, Maryland, June 1994. ACC.
[34] Rami S. Mangoubi, Brent D. Appleby, and G.C. Verghese. "Stochastic Interpretaion
of Ho, and Robust Estimation". In Proceedings of The 33rd Conference on Decision
and Control, pages 3943-3948, Lake Buena Vista, FL, December 1994. IEEE.
[35] Rami S. Mangoubi, Brent D. Appleby, G.C. Verghese, and Wallace E. Vander Velde.
"A Robust Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm". In Proceedings of the 34th
Conference on Decision and Control, pages 2377-2382, New Orleans, LA, December
1995. IEEE.
[36] I. Nikiforov, V. Varavva, and V. Kireichikov. "Application of Statistical Fault Detection
Algorithms to Navigation Systems Monitoring". Automatica, 29(5):1275-1290, 1993.
[37] Fernando Paganini. Sets and Constraints in the Analysis of Uncertain Systems. PhD
thesis, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 1995.
[38] Jan Palmqvist. On Integrity Monitoring of Integrated Navigation System. Licentiae
Thesis, Linkoping University, Sweden, 1997.
[39] R.J. Patton and J. Chen. Robust Fault Detection and Isolation Systems, volume 74 of
Control and Dynamic Systems, chapter 3. Academic Press, 1996.
[40] PBS. 21st century jet. Video Recording, PBS Home-Video, 1993.
[41] PBS. 777 first flight. Video Recording, PBS Home-Video, 1993.
[42] Asok Ray, Robert Geiger, Mukund Desai, and John J. Deyst. "Analytic Redundancy
for On-Line Fault Diagnosis in a Nuclear-Reactor". Journal Energy, 7(4):367-373,
July-August 1983.
[43] Karl Sabbagh. 21st Century Jet : The Making and Marketing of Boeing 777. Scribner,
1996.
162
[44] Martin L. Shooman. Probabilistic Reliability : An Engineering Approach. McGraw-Hill,
1968.
[45] Gilbert Strang. Introduction to Applied Mathematics. Wellesley-Cambridge Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986.
[46] Harry L. Van-Trees. Detection, Estimation and Modulation Theory, Part I. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc, 1968.
[47] George Verghese and Thomas Kailath. "A Further Note On Backward Markovian
Models". IEEE Transactions On Information Theory, 25:121-124, 1979.
[48] A. Wald. Sequential Analysis. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1947.
[49] Alan S. Willsky. "A Survey of Design Methods for Failure Detection in Dynamic
Systems". Automatica, 1976.
[50] Alan S. Willsky, G.W. Wornell, and J.H. Shapiro. "Stochastic Processes, Detection
and Estimation". 6.432 Course Notes, Spring 1997.
[51] A.S. Willsky and H.L. Jones. "A Generalized Likelihood Ratio Approach To The
Detection And Estimation Of Jumps In Linear Systems". IEEE Transactions On
Automatic Control, pages 108-112, February 1976.
163
